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THE CONSEQUENTIALIST/
NONCONSEQUENTIALIST ETHICAL
DISTINCTION: A TOOL FOR THE FORMAL
APPRAISAL OF TRADITIONAL NEGLIGENCE
AND ECONOMIC TORT ANALYSIS -
PAUL J, ZW1ER*
While economic analysis has proved useful in areas of law such as antitrust, tax,
corporations, and public utility law, it has only been explicitly used in tort cases in the
last twenty years.' The origin of the use of economic analysis in tort law is reported to
be Judge Hand's opinion in United Stales v. Carroll Towing Co. 2 In Carroll Towing, Hand
described the question of liability in terms of an equation: there would be liability for
the defendant's activities when the costs to the defendant to prevent harm were less than
the probability. that defendant's activity would cause harm multiplied by the extent of
that harm.' Hand's analysis is identified with the beginning of economic analysis in tort
law because it corresponds with the economist's assumptions regarding the nature of
man: that man is a rational being who seeks to maximize his self satisfaction or self
interest. 4 According to the economist, Hand correctly realized that defendants acted
reasonably under the "reasonable person" standard of care when he acted rationally in
comparing his own costs with society's needs and benefits. 5
Copyright © 1985 Boston College Law School.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond. I am indebted to J.P. Jones, Michael
Herbert, and Anthony Bocchino for their comments and criticism. Carol Slezak provided valuable
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See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS or LAW 15 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as R. POSNER,
ECONOMICS]; see generally B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975); G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter cited
as G. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS]; HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1976);
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Calabresi & Hirschoffl; Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, S HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Efficiency Norm]; Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. S'ruu. 103 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Posner,
Utilitarianism]; Posner, A Thew), of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29 (1972) thereinafter cited as Posner,
A Theory of Negligence]; Shavell, Strict Liability vs. Negligence, 9 J. LEG. S'ruu. 1 (1980).
2 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See also G.E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 218-44 (1980).
Posner would argue that economics has been the real basis of the tort decision all along, see R.
POSNER, ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 12, whereas White views Posner as an advocate, in that he is
directing tort law "to return ... to a deregulated, nondistributional state whose. doctrines are
intended to harmonize with and facilitate private interactions." G.E. WurrE, supra, at 219. White
does not agree that the neoconceptualization is a return of economic principles to the foundation
of tort law. He never has discovered them to be its ultimate foundation: "While perhaps there are
cases which suggest some economic analysis at work, clearly such analysis has never been the ultimate
basis of the tort decision -making." Id. at 220. See also Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal
of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEG. STun. 27 (1980); but see Posner, Efficiency Norm, supra note
1.
3 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The economic interpretation
of the Hand formula is elaborated in Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 1, at 32-36.
4 See R. POSNER, ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 122; Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 106,
5 R. PossER, EcoNomics, .supra note 1, at 125.
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Just as the economist argues that individuals act rationally when they make decisions
using Hand's formula," the judge reportedly acts rationally if he uses the economist's
"wealth maximization" principle as a basis for determining liability.' Economists argue
that a liability standard that "maximizes wealth" to society will best reflect the reality of
society's rational desire to increase its value. 8 They insist that judges either do decide or
ought to decide cases by selecting outcomes which increase, in dollar terms, value to
society."
Before Hand's pronouncement, and before the economists' generalization of eco-
nomic assumptions for judges' use, traditional negligence law was uniform in its use of
"fault" language (described in terms of duties, breaches of duties, and proximate
causes)."' The economic movement is frustrated by this traditional analysis for two
reasons. First, the economists do not believe that the language used in the traditional
analysis tracks the thought processes of the judge or the individual." Second, economists
assert that traditional negligence fails as an ethical system)" To economists the "ethics"
of negligence, identified as a kind of rough utilitarianism, has neither the structure nor
the definition to make it usable." In other words, economists argue that the ethics of
negligence lacks a method for calculating the effect of a decision or policy on society."
6 Id. at 3-4. Posner writes:
Economics, the science of human choice in a world in which resources are limited in
relation to human wants, explores and tests the implications of assuming that man is
a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions — what we shall call his "self-
interest."
Id. at 3.
Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 103 and 120.
8 See id. at 119-24.
9 See id.; R. POSNER, ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 18-19.
'° See W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
" See R. POSNER, ECONOMICS, ME/M2 note 1, at 3-10.
' 2 See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 119-21. But is it fair to say that economics is
"competing" with another system, or is the issue incorrectly framed? The economist argues that
economics describes the "true" underlying rationality of torts law. If this be the case, then economics
does not compete, it simply "is" the way courts decide cases. Putting aside whether this "is" in fact
the case, certainly the language used by the economist "is" neither universally nor even most often
used by the torts judge. Nor is the language of economics used in instructing juries on how to
decide cases. The economist argues that it ought to be used by both the judge and jury to decide
cases. In this way, its language system competes with traditional formulations. See generally G.E.
WHITE, supra note 2, at 218-44; Englard, supra note 2. My view that these torts language systems
are competing language systems is supported by Posner. See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at
119-36. It also stems from the analysis of debates between Professor Prosser and Professor Green
over Prosser's "proximate cause" analysis and Green's substituting duty/risk analysis. See Green,
Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42 (1962). One might also question with some
justification where the strict liability analysis is in this paper. I agree that strict liability is a potent
force in tort analysis, but in order to provide a focused comparison of the economic system with
an existing system, I have chosen duty/breach because of its longer tradition. Fault analysis also
seems to be creeping its way back into the strict liability system and therefore much of what is said
of negligence could also be said of an unreasonably dangerous defective product. See also Hender-
son, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Cot-um.
L. REV. 1531, 1536-38, 1571-73 (1973) (discussion of some of the consequentialist aspects of
products liability adjudication).
' 3 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 119-36.
14
 Id. at 113.
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Traditional negligence law also has had difficulty in deriving specific policies or guide-
lines from its general utilitarian principles."
The economist's second criticism is the primary focus of this paper. Economists were
and are demonstrably mistaken in their claim of ethical superiority. There is, in any
"real" ethical system, the need to be future-oriented; to predict future consequences in
the light of the decisionmaker's best guess about the needs and desires of future partic-
ipants in the system.' 6 The limitations placed on ethical systems that must operate in the
judicial arena make it impossible for any ethical system to be consistent, definite and
complete. Real world ethical systems need to allow for changing values and changing
valuation procedures. Should they ever be totally definite and complete, societies' growth
and evolution would be too easily stifled.
Analysis of economists' ethical criticism of traditional negligence also calls into
question their criticism that the traditional language of decisionmaking does not corre-
spond to actual thinking processes. The language of tort decisions is the language of
prediction which can never be a totally "rational" process. To require that a decision-
maker be only rational about the future, and neither intuitive, religious, or emotional,
in any way, is to require the decisionmaker to cease to be human. Additionally, total
rationality assumes the existence of both perfect information and perfect measuring
devices. Many "reasonable" people are either unable or unwilling to make such assump-
tions about either the information or the measuring devices they are given. It is this
combination of the lack of perfect information and inability to make accurate measure-
ments along with the inherent future looking orientation of the tort decisions that makes
the language of the traditional analysis the preferred language. A standard that requires
"reasonable" behavior as opposed to purely rational decisionmaking from both the
defendant and the decisionmaker takes these arguments into account. While this second
point about the preferability of the traditional negligence analysis is not the primary
focus of the paper the ground work for this judgment is laid in the analysis and
comparison of the formal ethical characteristics of "negligence" and "economic" analy-
sis."
To make this judgment concerning the ethical superiority of traditional negligence
or economics analysis, however, criteria for judging must be established. After criteria
has been developed the criteria will be used to analyze the ethics of negligence through
an examination of its elements: duty, breach, and proximate cause. Then, the ethics of
economics will be analyzed in comparison with the negligence language. Finally, the
paper will compare the results of these two analyses concluding that economics provides
no more certainty, definiteness, nor completeness than does the traditional language.
The principle spokesman for the economic movement, Professor, now Judge, Rich-
ard Posner provides some criteria for judging ethical systems." He defends economics
' 5 Id. at 114.
16 This is an assumption that I share with all utilitarians. See generally J. THIROUX, Emics, 20-
38 (1971).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 50 -51. Professor Englard makes these same arguments
more fully in his critique of Posner, see Englard, supra note 2, at 51-55. Perhaps my comparison of
economics and traditional negligence as formal ethical systems adds strength to these arguments.
i 8 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 110-11. Posner compares economics with utilitarianism
and it is in this context that he claims ethical superiority. He comments on the use of various criteria
for judging superiority of ethical systems:
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on two grounds: first that it meets certain formal criteria such as "logical consistency,
completeness, definiteness, and the like;"L 9 and second, that it does not yield "precepts
sharply contrary to widely shared ethical intuitions." 20 Only the first of Posner's two
grounds presents a useful basis for judging the superiority claim of economics. Posner's
second criterion is vague and the wording of the criterion reveals its unworkable ambi-
guity. "Precepts sharply contrary to widely held intuitions" is a standard which provides
too many definitional problems to make the criterion meaningful. The proponents of
any ethical system of analysis could easily respond to criticism under this criterion by
arguing that, as fully understood, decisions reached under their systems are not "sharply"
contrary (or not contrary at all) to "widely" held intuitions. Philosophers have expressed
logical difficulties with such criteria because of the impossibility of knowing which in-
tuitions are shared, which ones are "widely" held, or which positions are sharply contrary
to such widely held intuitions. 21 Accordingly, until some effective way of measuring
ethical intuitions is found, Posner's second ground for comparing the economic analysis
to the traditional negligence formulation is rejected. Instead, the criterion of formal
consistency, completeness, and definitiveness will be used to judge these competing
systems. 22
In order to focus and somewhat simplify the comparison of economics and tradi-
tional negligence on formal grounds, I have chosen to use the philosophers' tool of
The procedure for choosing between competing positive theories is straightforward.
A positive theory generates empirically testable hypotheses and is supported or refuted
by the results of the tests. This procedure is unavailable in the case of a normative
theory. What is to take its place? One approach, that of Rawls for example, is to deduce
an ethical theory from one or a few basic assumptions (e.g., that a just system is one
that people would choose in the "original position"). The assumption cannot be vali-
dated save by reference to [view the legal system through the lens of one of the
humanities or social sciences. If one approaches the system from a philosophical
perspective, one will probably reflect the low esteem in which philosophers today hold
utilitarianism. If one approaches it from an economic perspective, one is likely to
employ the concepts and methods of economics more systematically, explicitly, and
perspicaciously than the legal scholar of an earlier generation would have done.]
Id. at 110. The position of this paper is that the philosopher is more careful and systematic than
the economist.
' 9 Id.
20 Id. Posner offers a third criterion and then rejects it. The third criterion is to measure how
a society that accepts a system competes with other societies having other systems. He writes: "Or
third that a society which adopted the theory would not survive in competition with societies
following competing theories. The third is a very controversial criterion, and one that I shall not
pursue in this paper as it does not afford a basis for drawing sharp distinctions between the
economic and utilitarian approaches." Id. at 110-11. 1 reject this third criterion for the same reason.
21 See generally K. BALER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW (1958); L.J. BLINKLEY, CONTEMPORARY
ETHICAL THEORIES (1961); W. FRANKENA, ETHICS (1973); A.I. MELDON, ETHICAL THEORIES (1967);
P. TAYLOR, PROBLEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1967); J. THIROUX, ETHICS THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1979). •
22 I cannot resist making brief reference here to some studies in the "psychology of preference"
that may provide some basis for comparing how "acceptable" each system is to society's intuitions.
Though these studies do not answer whether the ethical directives of economics are "sharply
contrary" to widely held intuitions, they do suggest that there is significant deviation between
decisions dictated solely by objective probability theory and studied human decisions. See Kahneman
& 'I'versky, The Psychology of Preferences, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN ( January 1982). Researchers Kahne-
man and Tversky's studies will be referred to more fully later in the paper in relation to the formal
criteria. See infra notes 141, 142, and 144.
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ethical categorization." Philosophers have categorized ethical systems according to their
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist characteristics." Simply speaking, nonconse-
quentialists are those ethicists who are not concerned with the outcomes of their decisions
when deciding what they ought to do. Consequentialists, on the other hand, are con-
cerned with the ultimate result of their decisions. 25 Professor MacCormick, who studies
these categories in his article On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences: From Dewey to
Dworkin, 26 defines this division of decisionmaking ethics as follows:
One can conceive of two extreme positions. On the one extreme, the only
justification of a decision would be in terms of all its consequences, however
remote — in terms, that is, of its productivity of the greatest net benefit,
taking together all consequences and judging them by some suitable criterion
of benefit and detriment. On the other extreme, the nature and quality of
the decision, regardless of consequences however proximate, would be alone
allowed as relevant to its justification or its rightness. 27
The categorization process, then, is an examination of an ethical system's justifica-
tions. A system is consequentialist if it appeals to the effects on society when measured
against some standard or principle; 28 it is nonconsequentialist when the justifications are
found in rules or absolutes the system provides concerning how one ought to act. 29
Philosophers have found this simple categorization helpful to the analysis and com-
parison of various philosophical ethical systems.'" One commentator, Professor Jacques
Thiroux, asserts that there will inevitably he formal deficiencies and inconsistencies in
ethical systems where the systems are overly consequentialist or overly nonconsequen-
tialist." The consequentialist, at the extreme, excludes any possibility of rational justifi-
cation of a decision, since the ramifications of any ethical decision stretch forward into
infinity. In other words, future consequences are unknowable since the future is fun-
damentally unknowable. The nonconsequentialist, at the other extreme, ignores that the
nature and quality of decisions and acts are themselves constituted by the consequences
the decider intends, foresees, or hopes to bring about. Also, the nonconsequentialist
ignores the extent to which care for one's neighbor requires that one seriously consider
the foreseeable outcomes of one's acts and decisions before finally acting or deciding.
This is obviously more important the more momentous the act or decision under con-
sideration. 32
" J. Tinuoux, supra note 16.
24 While philosophers have long recognized two schools of thought in ethics, Thiroux is the
first that 1 know of to call them consequentialist and nonconsequentialist schools. Traditionally,
ethical theorists have been divided by the labels teleological and deontological. See W. FRANKENA,
Supra note 21.
" J. THIROUX, supra note 16, at 21.
MacCormick, On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 239 (1983).
27 Id. at 239.
" J. THIROUX, supra note 16, at 21. The various schools of egoism (universal, individual and
personal) as well as act and rule utilitarianism are categorized as consequentialist systems. Id.
29 Id. at 40. Thiroux categorizes Divine Command Theories and Kant's Categorical Imperative
ethics as nonconsequentialist ethics. Id.
so Id. at 21-56; see also Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 104 n.9. Posner seems to find this
categorization somewhat helpful. See generally D. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERATION (1980).
II J. THIROUX, supra note 16, at 49-50.
'2
	 supra note 26, at 239-40.
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Thiroux's criticisms provide a key to the analysis and comparison of economics with
traditional duty/breach language. Where each system makes ultimate appeals to conse-
quentialist arguments the indefiniteness of the ultimate standard and uncertainty pro-
vided for the unknowability of future consequences will call the . system into question."
Where the system's ultimate appeals are to rules and absolutes and thus are overly
nonconsequentialist, the proponent's articles of faith will be faulted for lack of rational
justification and will be criticized for their incompleteness. 34 In response to these criti-
cisms the nonconsequentialists inevitably smuggle into their system consequentialist ar-
guments." This in turn subjects the nonconsequentialist system to attacks not only for
incompleteness but also for 'inconsistency." Some degree of logical inconsistency is there-
fore necessary to any ethical system that tries to deal fairly with disputes and also produce
rules by which to govern behavior." In judging and comparing Posner's economic ethics
with negligence, this categorization process is extremely helpful. It exposes logical in-
consistency, incompleteness, and indefiniteness that exist in each competing system.
At least one commentator has contended that before starting any critique of a
proposed ethical system the critic should attempt to discover what is the existing ethical
system of law." This is necessary so that the new system's effect upon existing systems
can be adequately predicted. 39 Thus, a discussion of the ethical category of the negligence
system as it has traditionally been described is a useful starting place. Evidence for the
earlier assertion that ethical systems inevitably rest on beliefs and intuitions about the
future is found in the specific workings of the elements of the traditional negligence
system. Such evidence further supports Thiroux's observation that an unbalanced, overly
nonconsequentialist system will invariably include many consequentialist features.
I. THE ETHICS OF NEGLIGENCE
As has been noted earlier, the basic distinguishing feature of conventional tort law
is that it is based on "fault," while the economic basis of liability does not concern itself
explicitly with fault. 4° In Prosser's widely quoted treatise on torts, the fault system is
described as requiring that a defendant be found "blameworthy" before liability will be
imposed.'" "Blameworthiness" is described as an ethical shortcoming on the part of the
" See J. THIRoux, supra note 16, at 49-50.
" Id. at 46.
w Id. at 47. Thiroux asks, "[elven without this doctrine, when you push any ethical system back
far enough, asking why one should do these things, won't your answers have to bring in conse-
quences for yourself, others, or all concerned?" Id.
36 Id. at 49.
37 Posner seems to argue that proponents of other ethical systems generally are incapable of
deriving specific policies or guidelines for human behavior. He recognizes the inherent inconsisten-
cies in Rawls' work, in the Kantian theorists, in Fried and Epstein, and in Dworkin's theories. He,
however, claims that economists can improve the consistency and definiteness of the torts decision-
making system. Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 114-15.
3"D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM 110 (1967). Hodgson studies rule utilitar-
ianism and compares it with the common law system. The conclusions of my analysis of economics
are similar to Hodgson's conclusions concerning rule utilitarianism. The similarities are perhaps
necessary because Posner's ethic shares the features of other rule utilitarian systems.
39 1d. at 142-66.
4"R. POSNER, ECONOMICS, supra note I, at 18.
41 See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, 32.
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defendant. 12 Defendants' "blameworthiness" reportedly underlies society's feelings that
defendants ought to pay for or correct the harm they have caused.°
As a result of this intuition — that a defendant ought to correct the harm he caused
the plaintiff — fault-based liability has been saddled with the description of being "a
corrective justice" system.44 This label "corrective justice" suggests that liability is deter-
mined by a nonconsequentialist ethic. Where the "corrective justice" label is used to
point out the rule-oriented and backward looking features of the traditional system it is
an accurate label. "Corrective justice" is however a misleading and oversimplistic label if
it implies that the only and ultimate justification for liability is backward looking, rule-
oriented, and nonconsequentialist.° The "traditional" system clearly is not solely con-
cerned with the past behavior of the parties.° The "negligence" based system is more
complicated than that.
The ethics of "negligence" have been justified by a number of arguments. In The
Common Law,47 Oliver Wendell Holmes described the fault requirement as follows:
Why is a man not responsible for the consequences of an act innocent in its
direct and obvious effects, when those consequences would not have followed
but for the intervention of a series of extraordinary, although natural, events?
The reason is, that, if the intervening events are of such a kind that no
foresight could have been expected to look out for them, the defendant is
not to blame for having failed to do so . . .413
Holmes gave a series of justifications for the fault principle. First, he relied on principles
when he reasoned that "[t]he general principle of our law is that loss from an accident
must be where it falls . .. "49 Combining this principle with the supporting principle
that "{sltate interference is an evil, when it cannot be shown to be a good," 5" Holmes
justified the fault based system by pointing out that government interference is decreased
if fault needs to be shown in addition to causation. Second, Holmes found support for
the fault system in the definition of words commonly associated with analysis of the
notion of fault. Accordingly, he pointed out that fault requires an act, and
[t]he requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should
have made a choice. But the only possible purpose of introducing this moral
element is to make the power of avoiding the evil complained of a condition
of liability. There is no such power where the evil cannot be forseen .... A
man need not, it is true, do this or that act — the term act implies a choice,
— but he must act somehow. 51
In other words, Holmes argued that the definition of "act" entails an analysis of choice
which in turn entails a fault analysis. Third, Holmes justified the fault system by ap-
pealing to public policy. Thus he stated that "the public generally profits by individual
94 1d. §§ 4, 75.
" Id. § 75; O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 107-09 (1881).
44 See Englard, supra note 2, at 27.
42 D.H. HoncsoN, supra note 38, at 142-65.
46 ,rd.
" O.W. HoLmF.s, supra note 43.
48 Id. at 92.
Id. at 94.
5" Id. at 96.
51 Id. at 95.
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activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good, there is obviously no
policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the
actor."52 Finally, Holmes appealed to intuition or what he described as a sense of justice,
when he contended that "Nile undertaking to redistribute losses simply on the ground
that they resulted from the defendant's act would not only be open to these [above]
objections, but, as it is hoped the preceding discussion has shown, to the still graver one
of offending the sense of justice." 53
Holmes's arguments are neither very precise nor very consistent. They are typical,
however, of the rather loose and mixed system of justification for negligence law. 54 In
making definitional, intuitional, principle, and policy arguments Holmes was both non-
consequentialist and consequentialist. 55 His definitional arguments are essentially non-
consequentialist justifications because it is faith in the "inherent" meaning of words that
gives these arguments their persuasive power. 55 Somehow the use of a word over time
fixes a word's meaning and makes the definition of the word a tool for getting at "truth." 57
His appeal to intuition was also primarily a nonconsequentialist argument because in-
tuitions are unverifiable and are, therefore, based on the belief that they are widely
shared. 38
"
" Id. at 96.
54
	 Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 114-15. Posner writes that many writers of the ethics of
law can be faulted for this same inconsistent indefinite analysis:
Difficulty in deriving specific policies or guidelines from ethical premises is not, of
course, unique to utilitarianism; it is characteristic of ethical discussion generally. Rawls'
work, as we shall see, strikingly illustrates this point. And among contemporary Kantian
legal rights theorists, one has only to compare Fried and Epstein, who starting from
seemingly identical premises regarding human respect and autonomy, derive quite
different policy implications. If Dworkin is a -genuine" Kantian, and not simply a
utilitarian of the egalitarian school, the point is made even more dramatically. However,
the fact that utilitarianism is no more indefinite than competing theories of moral
obligation may not reconcile one to utilitarianism, especially one who happens to favor
limited government. Suppose, for example, that Bentham and many other utilitarians
are right that lacking any real knowledge of the responsiveness of different individuals'
happiness to income we should assume that every one is pretty much alike in that
respect. Then we need only make one additional, and as it happens plausible, as-
sumption — that of the diminishing marginal utility of money income — to obtain a
utilitarian basis for a goal of seeking to equalize incomes. For, on these assumptions,
it is easily shown that an equal distribution of income and wealth will produce more
happiness than any other distribution, unless the costs of achieving and maintaining
such a distribution equal or exceed the benefits in greater happiness. The qualification
is of course critical, but it places the burden of proof on the opponent of income
equalization in an area where proof is notoriously difficult to come by.
Id. The usual excuse given for why a closer, more precise analysis isn't given for negligence is found
in W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION
PLANS 8-9 (1965): "The whole concept of fault, even in our tons system, is so closely tied to views
of personal responsibility — and hence to values that have deep cultural and religious roots — that
we must limit our decision of it to narrow confines." Id. The reason given sounds like the reason
often given for not talking politics at the dinner table — because Mom always said so — or more
fairly because Mom knew it would be devisive or because Mom knew that dealing with ethics
involved predicting the future, which was largely a matter of faith.
55
 J. `CHruoux, supra note 16, at 57-66; see generally D.H. HODGSON, supra note 38, at 133-38.
56 1 THIRO1JX, supra note 16, at 39-50.
" Id. at 57-66.
58
 Id. at 57.
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Holmes's appeals to principle and policy, however, are consequentialist. 59 The ar-
gument from "principle" is consequentialist because principles, as opposed to absolutes
or "rules," exist to serve some unspecified utilitarian goal and are not ends in them-
selves." In other words, principles are "near" absolutes. People try to observe them in
every case, but they realize that there may be some justifiable exceptions to a principle
when some greater truth is served." The principle is powerful only if there is agreement
that the principle cited leads to the truth, or in utilitarian terms, to society's good. 62
Holmes's appeal to policy is likewise consequentialist in that it entails projection of the
effects upon society of certain decisions.63
Revealing the inconsistent and imprecise in Holmes's arguments, however, does not
mean that there is nothing that can be derived from them. It is at least clear from
Holmes's description that both appeals to consensus morality and consequences to society
ought to have play in the ethics of tort law. Holmes's inconsistency and indefiniteness is
in fact both predictable and understandable in the light of MacCormick's warnings about
overly consequentialist and overly nonconsequentialist systems." Holmes's imprecision
and inconsistency is inevitable. It exists in his failure to specify whether the fault system
is ultimately justified by the good consequences it produces deterrence of bad behavior
and compensation for the injured — or because fault is "inherent" to finding liability.
Holmes's set of justifications are directed only in a general way at the underlying
ethic of the traditional negligence language." The specific elements of the prima facie
case for "negligence" or fault-based liability need further analysis to see if the arguments
given for the elements provide ethical consistency and completeness for the system. 66
The most widely studied and followed analyses of the prima facie case of negligence law
was handed down by Professor William Prosser. 67 While Prosser will be the main au-
thority used for what currently describes "fault" law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts will
also be consulted from time to time where it provides insight into the ethical system of
negligence law." Both Prosser and the Restatement use the structure of a prima facie
59 Id.
GO Id .
Id. at 65.
" As Thiroux describes it, consequentialist theories based on certain guiding principles inevi-
tably lead to the problems of uncertainty and relativism. Id. at 57.
63 The word "policy" then is the label consequentialist judges have used to cover the forward-
looking and legislative aspects of their jobs.
MacCormick, supra note 26, at 239.
65 Holmes did attempt to break out torts from the rest of the common law system of justification,
and in this sense he is more precise than Hodgson in his analysis of the ethic of the common law.
See D.H. HoocsoN, supra note 38, at 110. Analysis of the parts of the negligence decision will
further improve the accuracy with which one can label the ethics of the traditional negligence
formulation.
66 While other commentators have centered their ethical analysis on one of the elements of
negligence; the duty element, in the context of nonfeasance, I have found no research which looks
at the ethics of the prima facie case or of the process of duty and breach. Leon Green has noted
the paucity of information about the substance of negligence and its rationale, and has suggested
that the process is the important part: "In other words, we have a process for passing judgment in
negligence cases but practically no 'law of negligence' beyond the process itself." L. GREEN, JUDGE
AND JURY 185 (1930).
67 W. PROSSER, supra note 10.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
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case to direct the decisionmaking process. 69 The use of a prima facie structure in itself
supports a nonconsequentialist deduction. Requiring a prima facie case to be established
by the plaintiff to the satisfaction of the judge seems to entail that the judge has the
duty to find for the plaintiff without regard to the consequences of the ruling once a
prima facie case is established. The process of making "findings" also suggests a non-
consequentialist ethic in that future effects of judges' decisions are arguably irrelevant.
Up to this point, then, the role of the judge can be described as that of a "finder"
regarding plaintiff's prima facie case. Prosser, however, like Holmes, provided a mixed
system of justification for this "prima facie" analysis. On the one hand, he urged the
judge to give priority to certain moral factors regarding negligence analysis." For ex-
ample, Prosser argued that defendant should not be liable where defendant shows that
the circumstances were beyond his control; that for instance, "no man rides a horse
without some chance of a runaway or drives a car without the risk of a broken steering
wheel or a heart attack." Prosser also wrote that the defendant's conduct must be judged
in light of the possibilities apparent to the defendant at the time, and not by looking
backward "with the wisdom born of the event." Further, he wrote, "[Ole standard must
be one of conduct, rather than of consequences." On the other hand, Prosser argued
that there is some "balancing" involved in the process — that even where moral blame
is weak plaintiff may recover." Prosser wrote:
[t]he court must put itself in the actor's place. At the same time, the standard
imposed must be an external one, based upon what society demands of the
individual, rather than upon his own notions of what is proper. Wherever
balancing directives enter a decisionmaking system, projections of conse-
quences and effects of a decision also enter in."
Prosser therefore seems to have left room for a certain degree of consequentialist
analysis.
For a clear look at where these balancing acts occur in the prima facie "negligence"
case, one must turn to the elements of duty and breach, the elements of the prima facie
case, which give specific direction to the court, and are at the heart of the traditional
negligence formulation." What can be said about the ethic of decision of the duty
element? The basic consensus is that this element is a legal question primarily controlled
by the judge. 74 As such the adjudicatory process seems to provide some flexibility in the
" W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 30: RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 281.
7 ') W. PROSSER, Supra note 10, § 31; see (11.50 RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 281.
7i W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 31.
72 Id.
" Prosser explained these elements:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on his part to conform to the standard required. These two elements go
to make up what the courts have usually called negligence; but the term quite fre-
quently is applied to the second alone. Thus it may be said that the defendant was
negligent, but is not liable because he was under no duty to the plaintiff not to be.
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury.
This is what is commonly known as "legal cause," or "proximate cause."
Id. § 30.
7 ' W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 53; Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLum. L.
REV. 1014, 1023 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Green, The Duty Problem]. "A duty, in negligence cases,
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processing of this decision since it is arguably not a "fact finding" process. 75 How is the
judge to decide whether there is a legal duty? Traditional negligence law has given very
few answers to this question. 76 The answer, however, seems to depend on which one of
two types of duty questions the particular duty issue falls into." Commentators tells us
that where the defendant has acted (misfeasance), tort law requires one system of
decisionmaking, 79 and where the defendant has not acted (nonfeasance), there is an-
other. 79 When the defendant has acted the question of duty is objective, that is the duty
is tested by a reasonably prudent person standard.9° The question of whether the
standard was breached is then answered by the jury. Therefore, in misfeasance cases
may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a
particular standard of conduct toward another." W. PRossER, supra note 10, § 53. Prosser stated:
There is little analysis of the problem of duty in the courts. Frequently it is dealt with
in terms of what is called "proximate cause," usually with resulting confusion. In such
cases, the question of what is "proximate" and that of duty are fundamentally the
same: whether the interests of the plaintiff are to be protected against the particular
invasion by the defendant's conduct.
Id. § 326; see also Bohler, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 U. PA. L. REV. 209,
213-35 (1905) (for the only guidance that can be found on the topic).
" W. PROSSER, Mira note 10, § 53. He wrote:
It is better to reserve "duty" for the problem of the relation between individuals which
imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other, and to deal with
particular conduct in terms of a legal standard of what is required to meet the
obligation. In other words, "duty" is a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the
duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the
light of the apparent risk.
Id.
)" Green, The Duty Problem, supra note 74, at 1024. I am certainly not the first to ask questions
about the nature of the duty element. Green points out the confusing state of this element:
How does the stating of the problem in terms of duties enable a judge to pass
judgment? Where shall he find the source of duties? Do judges find them ready made?
Do they assume them? Do they create them, and if so, do they create them in wholesale,
or must each court create a particular duty which fits the particular case then before
it? So far as I have been able to discover, the common law courts have stumbled
through the whole period of their existence without committing themselves on this
inquiry. Perhaps it is a subject which is not to be talked about. We are clearly dealing
with the very processes by which law is generated. And doubtless the questions as to
the paternity of these duties brought forth in case after case is embarrassing enough
at best.
Id.
" W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 56. Green agrees:
1. Affirmative conduct. The most definite boundary of negligence law is the line between
affirmative and negative conduct. Broadly speaking no person is under a duty to
another unless he has entered upon some course of conduct towards such other. As
long as a person does nothing he comes under no duty imposed by law. This is one
of the most dependable limitations upon duties, but it is a limitation seldom required
to be made. Probably after all we are merely saying that in the tort field at least this
power we call law is merely designed to control conduct and not to compel it. We have
enough to do to keep our activities within control, without attempting to regulate the
directions the latent energies of individuals should take.
Green, The Duty Problem, supra note 74, at 1026-27.
7" Green, The Duty Problem, supra note 74, at 1026-27.
7% Id.
B° W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 56.
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judges have no decision to make about whether a duty exists." However, where a person
has not acted, the court, or more specifically the judge, is required to find or declare
whether a duty exists that requires the defendant to have acted affirmatively. 82
In the nonfeasance cases the majority of courts, following Prosser and the Restate-
ment, direct the judge's decisionmaking function as follows: the judge is to find that a
duty exists only if he finds that a "special relation" exists which gives rise to the duty to
aid." The courts have found "special relations" to exist in certain generalized situations
and these may be indications of the ethical system of this element of tort law. 84 For an
examination of this element, the Restatement rendition on duties for the protection of
others is enlightening. 85 The Restatement, section 314 first states a general principle:
"The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action."88 Section 314A then goes on to specify that there are special relationships
between a common carrier and its passengers, 87 an innkeeper and his guests," a possessor
of land held open to the public and those invited on the land," and one who is required
by law or who voluntarily takes custody of another under circumstances that deprive the
other person of his normal opportunities for protection." The Restatement's caveat to
section 314A is most important: "The institute expresses no opinion as to whether there
may not be other relations which impose a similar duty." 91
The arguments over the category of ethics that the Restatement describes here go
both ways. Section 314 is a "general principle" in the negative. The societal goal towards
which the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is directed is not explicitly
stated by the Restatement.92 Prosser, however, suggested that
[t]he reason for the distinction may be said to be in the fact that by "mis-
feasance" the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while
by nonfeasance he has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely
failed to benefit him by interfering in his affairs. The highly individualistic
philosophy of this common law had no great difficulty in working out re-
straints upon the commission of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank from
converting the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one another. 95
Prosser's rationale seems to be simultaneously definitional (nonconsequentialist) and
roughly utilitarian (consequentialist)."
81 The decision has already been made. The common law has set the duty in misfeasance cases
as that of a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances. Prosser wrote, "the duty is always
the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk."
Id. § 53.
82 See id. § 56, at 339; Green, The Duty Problem, supra note 74, at 1026.
83 W. PROSSER, Supra note 10, § 56, at 339; RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 314A.
84 W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 56, at 341-50; RESTATEMENT, Supra note 68, § 314A.
85 RESTATEMENT, supra note 68,1 314.
96 Id.
67 Id. § 314A(1).
88 Id. § 314A(2).
85 	§ 314A(3).
99 Id. § 314A(5).
91 Id. § 314A.
97 Id. § 314.
93 W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 56.
94 Perhaps, however, to describe tort law as a normative ethical system, either consequentialist
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The language used by section 314A of the Restatement seems to presuppose a
or nonconsequentialist, is to assume something that some would be unwilling to accept — to assume
that law has something to do with telling people how they ought to live. Law may be defined as
nothing more than a description of the conventions and customs of a particular society. Law is then
only an outward manifestation of an ongoing process and lacks normative ethical content.
Take, for instance, the following position of tort law regarding duty: Where a stranger is
drowning, and a bystander can easily rescue without danger to life or limb, absent some affirmative
duty to the contrary, tort law does not require rescue. Yet the critic would point out that certainly
the moral thing to do would be to rescue the stranger. The contentions of society do not require
actions. Therefore, law and morality must be distinct. Law must not be concerned with normative
ethics if law provides such a rule. See W. FRANKENA, supra note 21, at 7S-96,
Obviously, there are a number of philosophical answers to this "amoral" argument. Within the
context of the tort doctrine, the answer might be that if this be tort law, then tort law "is an ass,"
or is immoral, not amoral. In other words, tort law should be changed to what the critic argues is
the obvious moral position. A Good Samaritan rule ought to be provided. In the alternative, the
nonconsequentialist might argue — accepting that the rule of torts ought to be as described above
— that this tort law is moral. Man's reason, or God's revelation, or nature, dictates that to require
man to rescue is contrary to reason, revelation or nature. Man's inherent rights to freedom to not
act, to be no one's slave unless by bargain or choice, requires that the rule of law for this situation
not force a man to rescue.
Professor Epstein, for instance, himself perhaps best categorized as a nonconsequentialist, a
Kantian, in that his final appeal about the rightness or wrongness of a decision is to a categorical
imperative, uses a nonconsequentialist argument concerning obligations to act, His argument is
instructive of a nonconsequentialist's ethical argument. Epstein writes:
Once one decides that, as a matter of statutory or common law duty, an individual is
required under some circumstances to act at his own cost for the exclusive benefit of
another, then it is very hard to set out in a principled manner the limits of social
interference with individual liberty ... [Epstein uses forced payment of money to save
a life as an example of the Good Samaritan principle].
Once forced exchanges, regardless of the levels of payment, are accepted, it will
no longer be possible to delineate the sphere of activities in which contracts (or charity)
will be required in order to procure desired benefits and the sphere of activity in
which those benefits can be procured as of right. Where tests of "reasonableness" —
stated with such confidence, and applied with such difficulty — dominate the law of
tort, it becomes impossible to tell where liberty ends and obligation begins; where
contract ends, and tort begins. In each case, it will be possible for some judge or jury
to decide that there was something else which the defendant should have clone, and
he will decide that on the strength of some cost-benefit formula that is difficult indeed
to apply. These remarks are conclusive, I think, against the adoption of Ames' rule
by judicial innovation, and they bear hearing on the desirability of the abandonment
of the Good Samaritan rule by legislation as well. It is not surprising that the law has,
in the midst of all the clamor for reform, remained unmoved in the end, given the
inability to form alternatives to the current position.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 198-200 (1973). Note that Epstein makes
no appeal to the bad consequences upon society of adopting a Good Samaritan rule. His argument
stops just short of doing so each time. His argument is that such a rule lacks definition. It lacks
clarity and demarcation. It is not "discoverable" nor "identifiable." Because the rule, "no duty to
rescue" is clearer, more easily defined, and consistent with the way the world understands liberty,
he "discovers" that the lack of an obligation to act is essential and is therefore the law. Likewise,
the consequentialist would agree about the normative nature of such a doctrine on the basis of the
results it produces arguing that the rule should be changed if the results do not measure up.
The distinction, however, between the "is" and the "ought" is a troublesome one. See Frankena,
"Ought" and "Is" Once More, in 2 MAN AND WORLD 515-33 (1969); see also D.H. HODGSON, supra note
38 (where Hodgson argues that law has a normative context).
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Kantian ethical basis, 95 because the ethic is one of finding duties by finding special
relationships to exist only where one of the listed relationships is in issue. Since the
Restatement provides a duty wherever a "special relationship" is found, the Restatement
position is a tautology. The very word "duty" supports the nonconsequentialist nature
of the processing part of this element. A deontological system, which has been categorized
by philosophers as nonconsequentialist, is by definition an inquiry into duties."
Though section 314A's format may be a nonconsequentialist one, this is not conclu-
sive of the ethical nature of the judge's decision. The consequentialist would argue that
95 RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, 314A.
Thiroux writes of the nonconsequentialist base to Kant's Duty Ethics, as follows:
Another famous rule of nonconsequentialist theory, Duty Ethics, was formulated
by Immanuel Kant. Kant first argued that it is possible to set up valid absolute moral
rules by reasoning alone, not by reference to any supernatural being or by empirical
evidence but by the same kind of logical reasoning which establishes such indisputable
truths in mathematics and logic as "2 + 2 4," "no circles are squares," and "all
triangles are three-sided," Kant's first requirement for an absolute moral truth is that
it must be logically consistent; that is, it can not be self-contradictory, such as the
statement, "a circle is a square," would he. Secondly, the trolls must be universalizable;
that is, it must be able to be stated to apply to everything without exception, not just
to some or maybe even most things. This is exemplified in the statement, "all triangles
are three-sided," for which there are no exceptions. Triangles may be of different
sizes and shapes, but they are by definition indisputably and universally three-sided.
If moral rules could indeed be established, as Kant thought, in this same manner, then
they too would be indisputable and therefore logically and morally commanding to
all human beings. Of course, people might disobey these rules, but we could clearly
brand such people as immoral.
In some ways, Kant's ideas were brilliant. For example, he could establish the fact
that living parasitically would be immoral because it would also be illogical. He could
say that the commandment, "[ajlways be a parasite, living off of someone else" is
illogical because if everyone lived like a parasite, then off whom could he live? It is
easy to see that the principle of universalizability causes the inconsistency here. Ob-
viously some people can be parasites, but not all. Now. if one could find such "moral"
absolutes, then a completely irrefutable system of ethics could be established, and the
obeying of the rules of this system would be what is moral, regardless of the conse-
quences to oneself or to others.
Kant next spoke about obeying such rules out of a sense of duty. He said that
human beings are often inclined to act in certain ways (that is, they are inclined to do
a variety of things such as give to the poor, stay in bed rather than go to work, rape
someone, or be gentle to children). Such inclinations, according to Kant, are irrational
and emotional and since we seem to operate on whim rather than reason when we
follow them, people must force themselves to do what is moral out of a sense of duty.
In other words, we have many inclinations of various sorts, some of which are moral,
some immoral, but if we are to act morally, we must rely on our reason and our will
and act out of a sense of duty.
Kant even went so far as to say that an act simply is not moral unless duty rather
than inclination is the motive behind it. A person who is merely inclined to be kind
and generous to others is not to be considered moral in the sense in which Kant uses
the word. Only if this person, perhaps because of some unexpected tragedy in his life,
no longer is inclined to be kind and generous to others, but now forces himself to do
so out of a sense of duty, is he acting in a moral manner. This seems quite a harsh
demand to most people, but at least it shows Kant's emphasis on his concept of duty
as it pertains to following clearly established absolute moral rules.
After Kant felt he had established moral absolutes, it seemed obvious to him that
to be moral one should obey them out a sense of duty. Therefore, he went on to form
the keystone of his moral system, the "Categorical Imperative."
J , THIROUX, supra note 16, at 43-44.
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this takes too narrow a view of what truly goes on in the process of deciding that a
special relation does or does not exist.97 This is the opening provided for by the Res-
tatement's caveat that the list contained in section 314A is not necessarily exclusive."
The consequentialist would point out that the law regarding duty is cognizant of the
consequences of either finding a duty or not finding one. The judge projects into the
future to try to determine what would be the consequences to society of imposing such
duties, that is, what would be its value to society and how would it be detrimental to
society. Many cases seem to support the position that a roughly defined consequentialist/
utilitarian basis — a basis that produces the greatest amount of good over evil — is the
ethic by which tort law decides the duty issue." The Restatement, however, does not
explicitly require that the judge go through this balancing process. 10 The common law
seems to allow expansion of affirmative duties only by analogy.'°' A discussion is there-
fore appropriate of the ethical nature of justification by analogy. 102
" Id, at 47. Thiroux writes about the tendency of many nonconsequentialist systems to smuggle
in consequences:
First of all, even Kant, who fought against consequences, seems to have smuggled
them in his reversibility doctrine. Even without this doctrine, when you push any
ethical system back far enough, asking why one should do these things, won't your
answers have to bring in consequences for yourself, others, or all concerned? For
example, in the Divine Command Theory, isn't it really possible to justify the more
immediately applicable and practical commandments as ethical necessities whether or
not you believe God gave them to human beings? One could ask why God is so wise
in having stated that human beings should not kill, steal, or commit adultery, and
answer that the consequences of not having some rules in those areas would be much
worse. If killing were freely allowed, then people's lives would be in danger constantly,
human growth would not be able to take place, and there would he no moral systems
or cultures, only constant battles to avoid being killed, These commandments help all
human beings to respect the rights of their fellows and bring some stability and order
into a social system which would otherwise be in a constant state of chaotic upheaval.
Id. at 47-48.
9' See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
9" See Tarasolf v. Regents of University of California, 17.Cal, 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968);
for more cites see W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 56, at 332-33.
ll') RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 314. The caveat to § 314A reads: "The Institute expresses
no opinion as to whether there may not be other relations which impose a similar duty."
i" , Id. § 314A, comment b reads:
(b) This Section states exceptions to the general rule, stated in § 314, that the fact that
the actor realizes or should realize that his action is necessary for the aid or protection
of another does not in itself impose upon him any duty to act. The duties stated in
this Section arise out of special relations between the parties, which create a special
responsibility, and take the case out of the general rule. The relations listed are not
intended to be exclusive, and are not necessarily the only ones in which a duty of
affirmative action for the aid or protection of another may be found. There may be
other such relations, as for example that of husband and wife, where the duty is
recognized by the criminal law, but there have as yet been no decisions allowing
recovery in tort in jurisdictions where negligence actions between husband and wife
for personal injuries are permitted. The question is therefore left open by the Caveat,
preceding Comment a above. The law appears, however, to be working slowly toward
a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual
dependence.
Id.
02 It must be noted that this discussion is not just limited to the duty analysis but applies
wherever the judge acts as a lawgiver or lawmaker.
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Much has been written about the nature of argument from precedent or by analogy
and what follows is not meant to be exhaustive on the subject. The following brief
analysis is meant only to point out the ethical characteristics of this process. This deci-
sionmaking justification can be viewed as ethical nonconsequentialist or consequentialist
justification. 103 The nonconsequentialist would argue that one decides a particular way
simply because "that is the way it was done in the past."'" If a controversy is a case of
"first impression," then the court is directed by the nonconsequentialist to make a
reference to rules in areas closest to that of the controversy.'" The nature of the analogy
justification would be that decisions are made on the basis of what has been done instead
of on the basis of what will be the effect of the decision. Such analysis is inherently tied
to a natural law view of the law.L 06 Faith in the unchanging nature of society's rules and
man's ability to reason his way to discover them is the ultimate basis of the decision when
it is made as described above.
This process of justification by analogy, however, can also be consequentialist.'" The
determination of which rules or policies are most similar often turns on the similarity of
consequences the rules are projected to produce. The consequentialist would point out
that the act of comparing the present controversy with past cases includes an examination
of the underlying policies and the legitimacy of those policies for the community.'"
"Rules" are not garnered from these past decisions, only "principles."'" This study of
the effect of the past principles on society and an analysis of these principles as a means
to certain societal ends is the process by which the consequentialist predicts the effects
of the new decisions."° Such analysis is obviously tied to a realist's philosophy of law.'"
The ultimate appeal here is to some principle for the attainment of "good" for society
and is, accordingly, consequentialist. 12 There is room, therefore, in the process of
justification by analogy for both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist arguments. It
is to this same point — that in the act of making decisions of law, negligence simulta-
neously makes use of consequentialist and nonconsequentialist justifications — that we
will return to when the element of proximate cause is discussed.
In the final analysis, then, the underlying support for the duty element and a
description of settled areas of tort law regarding duty seems to have explicit nonconse-
quentialist justifications and inexplicit consequentialist justifications. While the processing
of the law of duty has directives as to findings and is most often viewed as nonconse-
quentialist, the actual balancing process the court often goes through to "find" a duty
seems to have room for consequentialist justifications. The duty element's primary ethical
characteristics are consistent with those Holmes expressed, that duty is supported both
1°3 See, e.g., J. GREENBERG, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1976); STATSRY & WERNET,
CASE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING (1977); see also CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
104 D.H. HODGSON, supra note 38, at 111-41.
1 05 Id,
'° Id.
Id.
'0 Id.
1 0 9 Id. at 139- 141.
raid.
H 2 Id.
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by a rough sense of morality and by intuitions as to the consequence such a system will
produce." 3
II. THE ETHICAL SYSTEM OF BREACH
The question of breach, in both misfeasance and nonfeasance questions, is described
as a "fact" question.'" As such this question is to be left primarily to the jury." 3 It might
be assumed, then, that this element is a nonconsequentialist element in that it involves
the making of a "finding" that some rule has been broken. The directive most often
given to the jury concerning how they are to decide this question, however, is the
reasonably prudent person instruction," 6 which is justified primarily by consequentialist
arguments.
The primarily consequentialist nature of this decisionmaking process is evidenced
in Holmes's writing concerning whether the reasonably prudent person standard is
objective or subjective: 117
Suppose that a defendant were allowed to testify that, before acting, he
considered carefully what would be the conduct of a prudent man under the
circumstances, and, having formed the best judgement he could, acted ac-
cordingly. If the story was believed, it would be conclusive against the defen-
dant's negligence judged by a moral standard which would take his personal
characteristics into account. But supposing any such evidence to have got
before the jury, it is very clear that the court would say, Gentlemen, the
question is not whether the defendant thought his conduct was that of a
prudent man, but whether you think it was.
Some middle point must be found between the horns of this dilemma.
The standards of the law are standards of general application. The law
takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and
education which make the internal character of a given act so different in
different men. It does not attempt to see men as God sees them, for more
than one sufficient reason. In the first place, the impossibility of nicely
measuring a man's powers and limitations is far clearer than that of ascer-
taining his knowledge of law, which has been thought to account for what is
called the presumption that every man knows the law. But a more satisfactory
explanation is, that, when men live in society, a certain average of conduct,
a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary
to the general welfare. If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is
always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his
' 13 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 43, at 96.
"4 Green, Fareseeability in Negligence Law, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1401, 1421 (1961).
"' For an example of a typical jury instruction, see ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Civil
§ 10,01 (1961).
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, 1 mean the failure to do
something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something
which a reasonably prudent person would not do, under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would
act under those circumstances — That is for you to decide.
Id.
16 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, 283.
17 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 43, at 107-108.
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congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips
are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty
neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come
up to their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his
personal equation into account." 9
Holmes seems to have been primarily consequentialist in his argument for the
objective standard by his reference to what is necessary to the general welfare. Many
commentators have agreed with the tenor of these justifications and argued that the
consequentialist argument is not only primary but is the ultimate argument supporting
the reasonably prudent person standard." 9
[T]he great vice of the subjective theory ... — [the view] that negligence
[requires] indifference or inadvertance — [is that it] leaves the general se-
curity unprotected against that vast amount of dangerous and harmful con-
duct which results not from inadvertance or indifference but from deficien-
cies in knowledge, memory, observation, imagination, foresight, intelligence,
judgement, quickness of reaction, deliberation, coolness, self control, deter-
mination, courage or the like. 129
This consequentialist argument is probably the most widely accepted basis for the objec-
tive standard in negligence' 2 ' and provides the support for the conclusion that breach
of duty is ultimately consequentialist in ethic. 122 It is from such arguments that many
commentators find support for labeling negligence as a utilitarian system.' 22
Holmes, however, did not end his discussion of the reasonably prudent person
standard with an analysis of the objective nature of this standard. 124 He went on to
suggest that while the law does not take into account minute differences, a "blind man
is not required to see at his peril ... an infant of very tender years is only bound to take
the precautions of which an infant is capable," and insanity should also be taken into
consideration.' 25 In so arguing, Holmes seems to have been sitting simultaneously on
both the subjective/objective fence, and the consequentialist/nonconsequentialist fence.
Commentators, in reviewing the developing list of exceptions to the objective standard,
have noted that a subjective construction of the reasonably prudent person standard is
allowed wherever society feels more comfortable with its ability to discern defendants'
actual state of mind. 126 They point out that the law has made exceptions to the objective
" 8 Id.
"9 See Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference; The Relation of Mental States to Negli-
gence, 39 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1926).
'N Edgerton, supra note 119, at 867.
121 See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 32; RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 283, comment C.
122 Though the reason as to why, an objective standard is used is often left unstated by the
courts and may be viewed by courts as a matter of doctrine and definition, its ultimate basis seems
to be that of the Holmes consequentialist policy argument.
12' D.H. HODGSON, supra note 31, at 7, 8; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 110
(1908); Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note I, at 106.
124 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 43, at 109; see Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng.
Rep. 490 (P.C. 1837) (particularly the opinion of judge Tindal).
125 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 43, at 109.
126 See, e.g., James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REV. I
(1951):
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standard where defendants' particular deficiencies are more easily proven."'
The fluctuation between measuring conduct under an objective or a subjective
standard demonstrates that a system is consequentialist only to the point where there is
no satisfactory proof or adequate definition about the actual thought process that the
defendant went through. 128 The system takes on the appearance of a nonconsequentialist
ethic as experience provides understanding and empirical data about the actual thought
processes of fault. 129 Once this information is provided the system takes this information
into account without a continuing concern for the potential consequences of such deci-
sions on society.' 30
Apart from the objective/subjective debate, there seems to be a good deal of support
for the argument that negligence is ultimately clothed in nonconsequentialist garb. This
is especially true where the law of evidence appears to place constraints on the process. 13 L
Evidence law relayed by the judge informs the jury or trier of fact on the limited nature
of their decision.I 82 The jury is instructed that as fact finder they are not to consider
By and large the law has chosen external, objective standards of conduct. The reason-
ably prudent man is, to be sure, endowed with some of the qualities of the person
whose conduct is being judged, especially where the latter has greater knowledge, skill,
or the like, than people generally. But many of the actor's shortcomings such as
awkwardness, faulty perception, or poor judgment, are not taken into account if they
fall below the general level of the community. This means that individuals are often
held guilty of legal fault for failing to live up to a standard which as a matter of fact
they cannot meet. Such a result shocks people who believe-in refining the fault principle
so as to make legal liability correspond more closely to personal moral shortcoming.
There has, therefore, been some pressure towards the adoption of a more subjective
test. But if the standard of conduct is relaxed for defendants who cannot meet a normal
standard, then the burden of accident loss resulting from the extra hazards created
by society's most dangerous groups (e.g., the young, the novice, the accident prone)
will be thrown on the innocent victims of substandard behavior. Such a conclusion
shocks people who believe that the compensation of accident victims is a more impor-
tant objective of modern tort law than a further refinement of the tort principle, and
that compensation should prevail when the two objectives conflict. The application of
a relaxed subjective standard to the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, how-
ever, involves no such conflict. On this issue the forces of the two objectives combine
to demand a subjective test: the refinement of the fault principle furthers the com-
pensation of accident victims by cutting down a defense that would stand in its way.
For this reason the writer has elsewhere developed the thesis that there should be an
explicit double standard of conduct, namely an external standard for a defendant's
negligence, and a (relaxed) subjective standard for contributory negligence. Even if
this thesis is rejected, the same result probably prevails anyhow, because the application
of the legal standard is largely left to the jury, and juries, by and large, tend to resolve
doubts on both issues in favor of plaintiffs.
Id. at 1-2.
127 Id. at 17-22. James notes: "A blind man will not be required to see, though he may perhaps
have to use his other senses more sharply than one who can." Id. at 18.
12 ' O.W. HOLMES, supra note 43, at 107-109. But see Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468,
132 Eng. Rep. 490 (P.C. 1837); Edgerton, supra note 119, at 867 (for the arguments that the great
vice of subjective negligence theories is it leaves the general security unprotected).
129 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 43, at 109.
13° Id.
IM FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403. See 1 A J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 28 (Tiller rev.
ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE).
' 32 C. McCoRmiex, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 336, at 783 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). "Thus
'proof' is the end result of conviction or persuasion produced by evidence." Id. The trier of fact is
bound to consider only evidence presented by the parties.
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anything "extraneous" to that "presented by the parties." 133
 For example, in considering
whether a party has breached her duty the jury is instructed to consider all "relevant
evidence" presented by the parties. 134 This general instruction is not very helpful and
the definition offered by the Federal Rules of Evidence presents only a small clue as to
the ethics of the decision. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevance" as anything
of consequence.'" The problem that rule 401 presents the jury is determining what is
of consequence. Rules 407 and 411 make some specific statements as to what is not of
consequence. The trier of fact is not to consider whether the defendant or plaintiff is
insured; 1 °° nor are they to consider the wealth of the parties when deciding the issue of
fault.'" Evidence law, in these instances, denies to the decisionmaker consideration of
the very real, measurable, and immediate consequences of their decision.'" By so re-
quiring, evidence law seems to support a nonconsequentialist processing, but as to the
rest of what defines "of consequence" the federal rules give no information.'"
The actual psychology of this jury process is hard to determine. The jurors are told
that they are free to examine their individual experiences and draw on their common
sense to determine what they believe a reasonably prudent person would have done in
similar circumstances. 14° It is argued, however, that each jury member, despite instruc-
tions to the contrary, would instead invariably ask himself what he would have done in
similar circumstances. 141 Jurors may try to imagine what they would have foreseen and
measure the defendant against this imagination. 142
 The decision may then be reached
'° WIGMORE, supra note 131, tt 28.
194 1d.
13' FED. R. Evin. 401; see WIGMORE, supra note 131, 1 28,
16 FED. R. EVID. 411.
1,7 FED. R. EVID, 417.
as Wigmore argued that the law of evidence is distinct from the substantive law issues; the
distinction is made between immateriality and relevance. FED. R. EVID. 407 and 411 are indicators
that the rules of evidence do impinge upon what is of "consequences" in a torts case. Likewise the
acceptance of the distinction in evidence theory between the factfinding process and lawmaking
process supports a very nonconsequentialist ethic. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 131, 1 2.
159 See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee note (discussion of philosophical complications of
determining "relevance").
1 " James, supra note 126.
141 See Kahneman Tversky, supra note 22. They describe studies where subjects were asked
to make a series of choices. These choices would be made with reference to the objective criteria
provided by probability theory. The choices the subjects made often times varied significantly from
what the probabilities dictated were "reasoned" choices. They note:
If a decision is influenced by the reference point with which possible outcomes are
compared, what determines the reference point? The dependence of impressions,
judgments and responses on a point of reference is a ubiquitous psychological phe-
nomenon. The same tub of tepid water may be felt as hot to one hand and cold to
the other if the hands have been exposed to water of different temperatures. A given
income may be considered lavish or inadequate depending on whether one's earnings
have recently increased or decreased. In these cases the reference point is the state to
which one has become adapted.
Id. at 171. Likewise, each juror would create a reasonable person with reference to their experience.
"2 Id. at 171, 172. The impact of imagination on "objective reasoning" is described as follows:
In many cases, however, the reference point is determined by events that are only
imagined. Consider the following incident:
Mr. Crane and Mr. Thomas were scheduled to leave the airport on different
flights at the same time. They traveled from town in the same limousine, were caught
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by polling the jury about whether the defendant's activity constitutes a "breach" in their
imagination."' If this is indeed the process that takes place in the jury room then it
follows that a decision is reached when a sufficient number of jurors are persuaded to
agree with each other. This may occur when one juror makes vivid to the others'
imaginations what the juror argues the defendant would or would not have foreseen.'"
The position produced by this process is arguably what tells society and the parties
whether the community's standard of care has been breached. 145 Any division or uncer-
tainty may ultimately be worked out as a matter of "burden of proof." 46
The ultimate justification for a jury's decision is based upon the validity of, and faith
in, the unspecified and unknown psychology of jury deliberations."' The jury's ability
to "discover" or set out the community standard depends on their own sense of morality,
and their imagination and intuition as to the effect of such a standard on the parties
and on society. If the ultimate justification for the negligence system in the element of
breach is that the jurors collectively, by applying their common sense and community
intuitions, are the best source of the law of liability, then the system's ethic is arguably
mixed and inconsistent. At best such a system is a structured consequentialist system
whose adherents are successful in their defense of their system only where their audience
also "believes" in the jury's ability to do its factfinding appropriately.' 48
in a traffic jam and arrived at the airport 30 minutes after the scheduled departure
of their flights. Mr. Crane is told that his flight left on time. Mr. Thomas is told that
his flight was delayed and just left five minutes ago. Who is the more upset?
Almost everyone presented with this incident agrees that Mr. Thomas is more
upset than Mr. Crane, although their objective conditions were identical: both have
missed their flight. Furthermore, both had expected to miss their flight, so that Mr.
Thomas has no reason to be more surprised or disappointed than Mr. Crane. If Mr.
Thomas is the more upset, it is presumably because in the act of imagination Mr.
Thomas comes closer than Mr. Crane to catching his flight. The frustration experi-
enced in an unsatisfactory situation increases when it is easy to imagine a more
desirable alternative. For another example of the same notion, consider the following:
The winning number in a lottery was 865304. Three individuals compare the
ticket they hold to the winning number. John holds 361204; Mary holds 965304; Peter
holds 865305. How upset are they respectively?
There is general agreement that the experience is devastating for Peter, quite
severe for Mary, and very mild for John. Here again the ranking corresponds to the
degree to which the individuals can be described as having "come close" to winning
the prize.
An individual's experience of pleasure or frustration may therefore depend on
an act of imagination that determines the reference level to which reality is compared.
It is notable that the act of imagination by which one creates alternative realities
reflects many realistic constraints. If there were no constraints, John would find it as
easy as Peter to imagine himself with the winning ticket. Imagination appears to be
governed by rules, and the rules of imagination affect our experience of reality by
controlling the alternatives to which it is compared.
Id. at 171-72.
' 43 The jury often picks a foreperson and then takes an informal poll of each member's feelings
concerning liability. Then discussion takes place to persuade and make sure the evidence is consid-
ered.
144 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 22, at 173.
145 Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 30, 37-44 (1963).
146 Id. at 41-43.
14'7
	 supra note 131, § 37.7.
'48 Id.
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Note, however, that the two systems of rationale are worked into each other and do
not appear to be incompatible. Given that the underlying ultimate rationale is conse-
quentialist, and the process is nonconsequentialist, the whole ethic can be more aptly
labeled "structured consequentialism." The "structure" imposed on the system gives it
its nonconsequentialist appearance. The structure tells the individual decisionmaker
which consequences count and in which situations they should be applied. The duty/
breach system tries to take away, as much as possible, the .immediate decisionmaker's
discretion to apply his own view of what will produce the greatest good for society, and
instead imposes the views of those who create the structure of the decisionmaking
process. Therefore, while the underlying rationale of the system is consequentialist, the
decisionmaker is treated in the process very much like an automaton and must smuggle
in the consequential aspects of his decision. Such a system has the characteristics of both
a moral and an absolutist factfinding system, which is measured finally by unstated
intuitions concerned with the consequences on society.
Sometimes, however, this "structured consequentialist" label does not accurately
describe what the jury is directed to do. For example, consider the jury's dilemma when
presented with evidence of society's custom concerning the defendant's conduct. If the
process truly is a nonconsequentialist process, the jury would only need to be shown
what the custom was and it would have "found" the community's standard of care. "Duty/
breach" law, however, instructs the jury that custom is not final evidence of negligence,
but that it is free to set a standard of care higher than the present custom if it feels that
industry custom is lagging behind what it ought to bet" What then should the jury do?
Does it simply project the effect on society of raising the standard and decide whether
the consequences are better to society? This seems to be what is required of the jury in
these cases. Faith in the jury's ability to do this consequentialist analysis without producing
harmful effects on society is the basis of the acceptance of this method of the setting of
the standard of conduct. The process in this area, however, breaks from the structure
and is more openly consequentialist.
III. THE ELEMENT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
The nature of proximate cause, perhaps most clearly evidences the nature or the
mixed ethic in the traditional tort case. Prosser tells us that the nature of proximate
cause is a mixed question of law and fact."" The factual part of the inquiry is the cause
and effect inquiry."' The "legal" part of the inquiry is the "policy" part, left to the
judge) 52 The "legal" part is the most obvious place for a consequentialist judge to
consider the effects of his rule in the light of "proximate cause." While the "factual"
attributes of proximate cause point to a "finding process" which entails a consequentialist
ethic, it is the "legal" part of the element that initially deserves attention.
The historical debate over proximate cause and whether it should contain an ex-
amination of foreseeability suggests that there is not total agreement over whether the
decisions of liability are unaffected by nonsequentialist ethics)." In the famous case, In
149 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
" W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 45.
' 51 Id.
' 52 Id.; RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 434. See also In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
153 See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 43. Green argues that foreseeability should not be a part
of the proximate cause discussion at all, but should be left to the jury when the jury considers the
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re Poiensis, 154 the English court argued that once a sufficient direct causal relationship is
established, the law should not be concerned with whether certain types of damages or
certain unexpected plaintiffs were forseeable.' 55 Polemis concluded that once the fault
issue was determined liability would follow without regard to the far-reaching effects of
such a rule on society.' 56 The rule was set because of definitional arguments about cause
and effect and because courts were said to be incapable of defining foreseeable plain-
tiffs. 197
It follows, then, that according to PoJena's, the ethic of this element is nonconse-
quentialist. Disagreeing with the ethic of Polemis, Justice Cardozo, in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., asserted a "bad effect" on society if the fact of unforeseeability of certain
plaintiffs, which he described as plaintiffs "beyond the zone of danger,"'" did not
preclude proof of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Polemis held that once a duty is
breached, it is breached to the whole world. Any plaintiff, whether forseeable or unfor-
seeable, would be able to recover as long as there was an uninterrupted direct causal
relation between his injury and the defendant's acts. 15" The side effects of the noncon-
sequentialist, Polemis-type ethic, Cardozo argued, would make the courts ineffective
controllers of runaway juries.'" The result would be "bad" for society.'" Cardozo, here,
is more openly utilitarian in his analysis. His zone of danger language allows the law suit
between defendants and certain plaintiffs to be cut off where such law suits become too
burdensome to court and defendant alike. 162 The consequentialist, following Cardozo's
analysis, or some like analysis,'" would argue that tort law today is controlled by the
proximate cause (or duty/zone of danger analysis) element and that it is in this element
that the judge considers the consequences of his decisions on society.'"
element of negligence. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Green, Causal Relation Issue).
154 [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
' 55 Id. at 570. For criticism of Polemic, see also Goodhart, The Brief Life Story of the Direct
Consequence Rule in English Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 857 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Goodhart,
Direct Consequence Rule],
1 " Goodhart, Direct Consequence Rule, supra note 155, at 860-61.
' 57 Polemis, 3 K.B. at 570.
' 58 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 343, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
' 59 Polemic, 3 K.B. at 562-63.
185 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 342-43, 162 N.E. at 100.
Id.
162 Id. at 344-46, 162 N.E. at 104-06.
'" See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 43; RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 435(2). The limiting
words used here are to cause a decisionmaker to consider whether, when looking backwards, the
event would be considered highly extraordinary.
1 " Prosser stated:
It seems evident that in all of these proposed rules and formulae the courts and the
writers have been groping for something that is difficult, if not impossible, to put into
words: some method of limiting liability to those consequences which have some
reasonably close connection with the defendant's conduct and the harm which it
originally threatened, and are in themselves not so remarkable and unusual as to lead
one to stop short of them. It may be questioned whether anyone has yet succeeded in
accomplishing more than the courts themselves have been able to achieve with the
idea of such a reasonably close connection contained in the despised word "proximate,"
which may have more in the way of merit than is usually credited to it.
W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 43.
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The law of "relevance" from the field of evidence law, however, seems to once again
give the element of proximate cause a nonconsequentialist structure. Causation issues,
as factual inquiries, are supposed to be jury decisions.'" The judge's role is initially only
to instruct the jury on what proximate cause is; thereafter the judge is only to act when
he somehow decides as a matter of law that there is no evidence of proximate cause.'"
The information given to both the judge and jury by which to make this proximate
cause decision is very limited. The only information given to the judge to make his "legal
decision" is like cases from the past.' 67 Evidentiary limitations prohibit irrelevant consid-
erations concerning the effects of the judge's decision on parties not before the court.'"
Hence, a judge is rarely aware of the broader impact that his ruling on proximate cause
will have.'" The jury does not even have past case information, and evidence not
presented in court is immaterial according to the dictates of evidence law."°
This information concerning consequences, the consequentialist would argue, can
slide in to the trial by the side door."' Evidence given to the jury concerning customs in
the industry,' 72 and the cost of changing some pattern of behavior can be used as a basis
to predict the societal consequences of the judge's rulings and jury's decision.'" The
judge, however, is directed by the law of evidence to instruct the jury on the limited
l65
166 Prosser described the historical inquiry as a search for the direct "cause." Id. § 43. Prosser
noted this illusory factfinding feature of the proximate cause "inquiry":
The usual answer has been that "foreseeability" means "in proximate cause" the same
thing as in negligence; and that the same considerations which determine the original
culpability are to be used again to determine liability for consequences. This has a
comforting sound of predictable certainty and facility of administration. But, with
deference, it is submitted that both are quite illusory.
Id. Professor Calabresi agrees:
I am using "cause" here and throughout this book as a "weasel" word. I do not propose
to consider the question of what, if anything, we mean when we say that specific
activities "cause" in some metaphysical sense, a given accident; in fact, when we identify
an act or activity as a "cause," we may be expressing a number of ideas.
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 78-80 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Calabresi, Concerning Cause).
167 D.H. HODGSON, supra note 38, at 120.
1 " Id. at 137.
169 Id. at 138. Hodgson writes:
Utility is given less weight than justice. And when it is considered, it is not done in a
thorough and systematic way, on the basis of sociological evidence. The judge simply
estimates and evaluates, as best he can, some of the more noteworthy consequences
of the rule and its alternatives. His knowledge of sociology is usually no more, and no
less, than that of a normal well-educated man, except insofar as he, as a lawyer, has
had the opportunity to observe the law in action; and his values, too, are usually those
shared fairly widely in his society. In earlier times, informed common sense was the
best means available for accessing consequences. Now that sociological inquiry and
evidence is possible, it might seem better to make use of it; but this is a question which
cannot be dealt with here.
Id.
' 7° Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978); Henderson,
Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 906 (1982).
' 71 See e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
172
 Id. at 740.
'" Id. Calabresi also notes the dual nature of accidents and accident prevention inquiries. See
Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 166, at 82.
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nature of this evidence, its relevance to the fault of the defendant, and its irrelevance
to a consideration of the effect of their decision on an industry as a whole. 174 It is unclear
how the judge can be consistent if he chooses not to follow his own instructions con-
cerning those propositions that are relevant to the adjudicatory process. If the judge
uses this information, given to the jury with limiting instructions, to study the conse-
quences of his ruling, the actual features of his decision are hidden from examination. 175
Despite the inconsistency with judges' directives to juries, it is apparent that judges are
doing this in many cases. 08 In these cases, the judges appeal to their beliefs as to the
societal consequences in "finding" or "not finding" a proximate cause relationship to
exist. 177 Once again, therefore, while the substance of the proximate cause element is
most often thought of as consequentialist, it certainly is nonconsequentialist in the
evidentiary limitations which constrain and obscure the decision.
It is at this point in the proximate cause analysis that many critics become most
frustrated with traditional tort analysis. What is the true basis, they ask, of the court's
proximate cause decision? 178 Proximate cause, where it is legal, as opposed to factual, is
not "saved" by appealing to a magical jury process. How indeed does the judge make
this decision?' 79 Because the process does not provide the "information" for the judge
to know the policy effects of tort decisions, some critics have argued that the judge is
arbitrary and unreasoned in his decisionmaking process."° The judge pretends to be
nonconsequentialist although he will make selective use of veiled consequentialist policy
arguments."' It is perhaps this ethical inconsistency in the more policy-oriented proxi-
mate cause position that leads the majority of American courts to adopt the Palernis type
1 " 3A REID'S BRANSON INSTRUCTIONS To JURIES § 1370 (1961) (negligence to be shown before
damages allowable). These instructions imply that fault must be determined without reference to
the effect of the extent of such damage awards on the defendant or other like defendants. But see
Boomer v. Atlantic Const. Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1970) (example
of a court's handling of injunctions in nuisance cases and their consideration of the effects of their
rulings on parties not before the courts).
115 Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 166, at 78-80. See also WIGMORE, supra note 131,
§ 37.7.
' 76 See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554 (1969). In Tobin, Justice Brietel wrote:
Beyond practical difficulties there is a limit to attaining essential justice in this area.
While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal
limited perforce by the realities of the world. Every injury has ramifying consequences,
like the rippling of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the
legal consequences to a controllable degree.
Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 619, 249 N.E. at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561. Judges have also used consequentialist
reasoning in their analysis of duty. See Green, The Duty Problem, supra note 74, at 1040.
'" The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1932); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41,
441 P.2d 912, 924-25, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 83-84 (1968).
178 Green, Causal Relation Issue, supra note 153, at 544-45.
178 Green writes that the judge cannot use "proximate cause" effectively because proximate
cause is overburdened with the analysis of many separate issues. Id. Other commentators are
disturbed by the ambiguities of a causal system of analysis. See Epstein, Strict Liability, supra note
94, at 160-69, 172-85, 189-91, 197-202, 203-04 (discussion of Professors Coase and Fletcher's
troubles with causation doctrines with which Epstein himself has less trouble).
188 G. CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 7-16. G. Calabresi, Concerning Cause,
supra note 166, at 105-08.
181 Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 166, at 108.
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analysis of proximate cause, that the proximate cause decision is made only with regard
to some notion of causal directness.' 82 At least under such analysis the court can continue
to pretend to be more consistent, and pretend that such a decision is made simply by
analyzing the facts presented by the parties before the court.
Nevertheless, even those courts that go beyond Polemic and analyze the broader
policies in discussing proximate cause (those who prefer to discuss whether there exists
a "superseding intervening cause" or whether the examination of the duty element will
include the risks covered by the duty) couch the analysis as a "finding" process, 185 a
nonconsequentialist process, done only with reference to the parties before the court.
These cases all fail miserably at making complete and consistent justifications for the
court decisions.'" The word games used in these cases provide the appearance of
rationality without acknowledging inconsistent, indefinite, and arbitrary consequentialist/
nonconsequentialist appeals.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AS TO DUTY/BREACH/PROXIMATE CAUSE
To speak as if the duty/breach system is solely a nonconsequentialist, backward
looking system is to speak imprecisely. 185 To label this traditional negligence law utilitar-
ian and consequentialist is also too simplistic. 1136 The duty/breach/proximate cause system
has a mixed consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethic. It is, more accurately, con-
sequentialist in substance and nonconsequentialist in process. As has been previously
noted, in routine cases this "structured consequentialism" seems to work fairly well.
However, where society has little experience with the case, the negligence system's
ultimately consequentialist ethic breaks into the open.
It is easy to see from the foregoing discussion of the elements of negligence why
the economist is frustrated and dissatisfied with negligence as an ethical system. To the
economist, the system is an unwieldy combination of consequentialist and nonconse-
quentialist decision justifications. 187 Where the system is dogmatic, and nonconsequen-
tialist, in its formulation in a prima facie case constrained by a fact finding process, the
economist argues that the system is incomplete and logically inadequate.' 88 The econo-
mist questions how this formulation produces "good" for society. Is there not some better
scientific or empirical basis for tort law? 188 The economist asks whether the tort system
really deters bad conduct,'"" whether it compensates adequately,I 8 ' and how negligence
proponents know their system is the best.'" Where the system is consequentialist —
primarily in the creation of "duties," in the objective reasonably prudent person standard,
and in the analysis of proximate cause — the economist wonders how the system can be
18 ' See C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 279-80 (1977).
'" See Green, Causal Relation Issue, supra note 153, at 568-69.
189 id.
185 See Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, S J. LEG. STUD. 49,
74-75 (1979).
186 Id.
187 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 111-19.
181' Id. at 114-19.
189 Id.
19° Id.
19 ' Id.
' 92 Id.
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made to speak with consistency in its decisions and give consistent reasons for its rules. 193
He is thereby frustrated by the indefiniteness of negligence and its resultant arbitrariness
and lack of predictability.'"
Is there any good word left to say about the negligence system? Can it be defended
on any grounds? MacCormick probably provided the negligence proponent's best de-
fense. Where MacCormick pointed out that a system can not be overly consequentialist
or nonconsequentialist, he implied that a system can never be wholly consistent nor
complete. This is because of the simultaneously backward-looking and future-predicting
features of an adjudicatory decision. 195 Inconsistency, incompleteness, and indefiniteness
may be inherent to both systems.
V. THE ETHICS OF ECONOMICS
In order to give context to what has developed as Posner's economic ethic, a brief
discussion of Posner and Calabresi's ethical debate is appropriate. 196 Much of what Posner
writes concerning the ethic of economics is in response to Calabresi's attempt at an
economic decisionmaking system. 197 This exchange is an excellent example of the neo-
conceptualization process at work in tort law.'" Such a discussion indicates the movement
of an ethical legal system from a consequentialist position into a nonconsequentialist
structure.'?"
Calabresi articulates criteria for the decisionmaking process for economic analysis
which balance two basic goals. 200 The first is the compensation goal; the second is
deterrence. 2°' Each is derived from Calabresi's belief about what would produce good
for society. Each of the two goals has two components: the compensation goal is broken
down into the subgoals of spreading losses and distributional equity202 while the deterrent
goal is bifurcated into specific deterrence and general deterrence. 203 Calabresi argues
that the best way to provide for these goals is to set up a system that refers every decision
made to the key question of who is the cheapest cost avoider. 2" This decision must take
199 Id .
194 Id.
1 J 5 MacCormick, supra note 26, at 239-40. See also WIGMORE, supra note 131, § 37 (discussion
of inherent evidentiary relevance limitations); Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L.
REV, 901, 904 (1982) (discussion of the adjudicatory constraints necessary to any tort system).
I9" the time of this writing, a new piece has appeared that further refines the ethic of
economics. 1 believe much of my criticism of Posner's economics ethics is applicable to Grady, A
New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983).
Grady, like Posner, is hard to critique since he insists that he is being "descriptive" as opposed
to being normative. id. at 799. Clearly, however, judges do not consciously do the technical analysis
he suggests, nor do they justify their decisions by the use of this system. In order, then, for his
writing to be useful, it must be a normative suggestion. As such his technical analysis fails as a
formal "objective' system for the same ebnsequentialist uncertainties that plague Posner's system.
See also supra note 2.
197 Englard, supra note 2, at 51.
1" See G.E. WHITE, supra note 2.
1 " See G.E. WHITE, supra note 2; Englard, supra note 2, at 47.
209 Englard, supra note 2, at 47.
201 Id .
202 Id,
2os
204 Id. at 36.
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into account the person who is in the best position to make a cost/benefit analysis between
accident cost and accident avoidance cost. 2°6 Since Calabresi's system is principally con-
cerned with cost avoidance, it is a consequentialist system. Calabresi argues that such a
goal will be achieved if one follows the process of answering "the best cost avoider"
question. 206
Commentators have argued that Calabresi's system is faulty. 2 ° 7 Professor Englard,
for instance, argues that Calabresi places too much faith in accident cost reduction at
the expense of the autonomous nature of traditional legal policies. 208 Additionally, En-
glard argues that Calabresi is too much of an instrumentalist with his economic analysis
in that he overlooks the need for value judgements in determining specific legal policies.
Englard finds Calabresi in the end to be a utilitarian in the extreme. 209
The commentators criticize Calabresi where Calabresi is unabashedly and overly
consequentialist. They find his system lacks definition of values, causally treats moral
and religious values, lacks respect for individual legal responsibility, lacks sensitivity to
individual person cost, and lacks predictability and uncertainty of the knowledge of
consequences. 210 Posner, in describing his version of economic analysis, joins Calabresi's
critics in many of their attacks. 2 " To these criticisms he adds another, directed once
again at where Calabresi is overly consequentialist. He takes Calabresi to task for his lack
of empirical verification of his theory: "Calabresi's work is an uncertain portent too, not
so much because he himself has declined to move beyond prefacing statements of general
principle as because he apparently considers such statements an adequate substitute for
examining how the legal system works." 2 ' 2
How then does Posner try to remedy the problems with Calabresi's economic system?
How can he make the claim that his system provides the certainty that utilitarian/
consequentialist systems generally lack? Where Posner breaks from Calabresi and si-
multaneously where he is different from traditional common law analysis is that he
organizes the total decisionmaking process of all common law decisions around the
analysis of the general proposition that a judge ought to do that which maximizes wealth
to society as a whole. 2" There is, therefore, no need for traditional contract analysis, or
negligence analysis. Thus, Posner's process does not involve duty analysis, nor breach
analysis, nor proximate cause analysis, nor offer analysis, nor acceptance analysis. 214
Contract law and tort law are presumably submerged, if they exist at all, in the economic
analysis of this one major principle.'" The liability decision rests solely on which decision
alternative maximizes wealth to society. 216
This principle is obviously consequentialist and at first blush appears little different
from Calabresi's. The difference is only that Posner says explicitly "wealth maximization"
205 id.
206 Id. at 43-47.
207 Id. at 47-51.
2°0 1d. at 36.
200
 Id. at 34.
21 " Id. at 50-51.
211
 Id. at 53.
212 Id.
212 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 119-35.
214
	 WHITE, supra note 2, at 220.
215
 Englard, supra note 2, at 51-52 & n.109.
216 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 123-24.
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for what is left unstated as the utilitarian principle behind the four goals to which
Calabresi adheres. Where Posner claims to improve on Calabresi is that his system
provides a workable process for determining his utilitarian principle."' Posner argues
that Calabresi has not provided a workable process for directing the decisionmakers in
an adjudicatory system concerned with identifying the best cost avoider." 213 Posner
argues that his theory of liability is workable and definite. 219
While Posner is speaking in the context of comparing his theory with Calabresi's,
his description of this economic theory should also serve well as a basis of comparison
with the duty/breach language. The above description of Posner's ethic seems to show
that he offers something different not only from Calabresi's system, but also different
from the duty/breach system. Assuming, however, that one agrees with Holmes's earlier
discussion concerning the underlying philosophy of the basic element of fault, that it is
a rough utilitarian one that examines a case in order to protect a society from careless
people and therefore to promote that society's general welfare, 22° one can readily rec-
ognize the common utilitarianism of the two systems. Each system has basic consequen-
tialist principles that ultimately control the decision that is to be made; the difference
lies in the economist's definition of what is "good" for society.
Posner is explicit in stating for economics what is left unstated by Holmes, Prosser,
and the Restatement regarding negligence. By explicitly defining his utilitarian principle,
Posner opens himself up to the usual attacks on the consequentialist nature of utilitar-
ianism. Critics must ask whether Posner's substitution of the word "wealth," which he
redefines as the value in dollars of everything in society, 22 ' for what the utilitarian usually
refers to as "promoting the greatest balance of good over evil," improves the utilitarian
principle. 222 It seems he has merely asserted that he can measure good; that economists
have a process for measuring what is of value or what is "good." Viewed in this way the
stated principle is simply a tautology. The negligence system similarly defines what will
produce good for society by referring decisionmakers to its process or prima facie case.
Both systems involve a "leap of faith" that their process will in fact be able to consistently
predict what will be "good" or produce wealth for society in the future as well as the
present. 223 Both systems have the problem of how to adequately value the various physical
and nonphysical individual rights and societal needs. In the final analysis, then, Posner
will have a superior system only if there is agreement that his processing system produces
the greater good or "maximizes wealth."
Posner uses the Learned Hand formula to determine what will maximize wealth for
society. Where B is the burden to the defendant, P is probability of harm, and L is extent
of injury, Hand's formula is simply B < P x L. Dollar units representing the value of the
activity of the defendant will be inserted into the formula to determine the burden (B)
on the defendant and the extent of the liability (L). 224 If defendant's burden is less than
the probability of harm times the extent of liability, then the defendant will be liable- 223
217 Id. at 127-35.
2 ' 8 1d. at 123-24; Englard, supra note 2, at 53.
219 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note I, at 123-24.
228 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 43.
221 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note I, at 123.
222 Englard, supra note 2, at 51-52.
223 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 123-24.
224 Id. at 120.
225 Id.
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Posner claims that if the judge follows this process wealth maximization will be guar-
anteed. 226
The comparative features of the economic system and the negligence system are
obvious. Where traditional negligence uses the prima facie case, the economist uses a
mathematical formula. The mathematical formula provides a nonconsequentialist ap-
pearance similar to that of negligence's prima facie case. Posner argues that dollar values
are "found" by reference to economic models. 227 These values are plugged into the Hand
system which will give the answer concerning whether the defendant is liable, which in
turn will maximize wealth. Such a process downplays the overtly consequentialist aspects
of the decision.
What are the economic models or reference pointS Posner's decisionmaker uses to
"find" the values to substitute in for the variables of Hand's formula? To Posner, adju-
dicatory decisions are made with reference to "market theory." 226 'Market theory" is
Posner's processing device by which determinations can be made concerning the worth
or values of certain activities that are before the court. 229 He thereby further cloaks the
consequentialist nature of his decisionmaking system within a market theory process
which he describes as a nonconsequentialist act of "finding." The dollar value for deter-
mining wealth maximization is "found" by using either "actual" or "hypothetical" mar-
kets, 23° The actual market, Posner tells us, is "right" for the majority of cases that involve
voluntary transactions. 2" In the realm of "accidents," however, Posner writes that the
transaction is not voluntary, and since no value has been placed by the parties themselves
on the activity, the value of the activity must be made with reference to a hypothetical
market. 232 Since most tort cases deal in the realm of accidents, and are nonvoluntary,
Posner implies that most "tort" decisions to he made by the economist will be referred
to the hypothetical market. 233
Use of the hypothetical market has great similarities with negligence's use of the
reasonable person theory. For example, Posner suggests that if A owns a bag of oranges,
and Posner accidentally smashes A's bag of oranges because he is walking very fast with
them, when the court is asked to decide liability, the court should apply the Hand
formula to place a dollar value on A's oranges and a dollar value on Posner's walking
very fast. 234 The hypothetical market is supposed to "supply" the dollar value for the
oranges and the dollar value for walking very fast. Posner, however, does not reveal his
226 Id.
"7 Id.
229 Id. at 119-20.
229 Id.
239
	 As Posner explains:
The market, however, need not be an explicit one. Even today, much of economic life
is organized on barter principles; the "marriage market," child rearing, and a friendly
game of bridge are some examples. These services have value which could be mone-
tized by reference to substitute services sold in explicit markets or in other ways. They
illustrate the important point that wealth cannot be equated to GNP or any other
actual pecuniary measure of welfare. A society is not wealthier because of a shift of
women from household production into prostitution.
Id. (emphasis in original).
231 Id .
232 Id.
2" Id. at 120-21.
239 id. at 121.
July 1985]
	
NEGLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC TORT ANALYSIS 	 935
thinking about precisely how, by referring to some hypothetical market, a dollar value
is found. In this way he puts the decisionmaker in the same situation a jury is put in
when it is told to make a decision with reference to a reasonably prudent person.
Presumably the economist would talk in terms of "cost" and "benefit," "supply and
demand," "opportunity cost," and "risk and return" instead of "custom," "foreseeability,"
and "personal experience." Use of economic jargon, however, does not negate the similar,
hypothetical nature of the process.
For specific concrete evidence of how an economist would value certain activities
and commodities in a torts setting, where there is no voluntary buying and selling, one
must turn to an analogous situation, also a forced transaction, where an economist values
activities and commodities. Courts are, at times, called upon to determine the value of
a dissenting shareholder's stock when the stockholder exercises his appraisal rights. This
judicial determination concerns a forced transaction and economists are often called
upon to aid the process. 235 Note here that the process of valuing shareholder stock is a
part of the decision involving a business. Valuing a business can be recharacterized as
the process of valuing activities and assets and liabilities and, therefore, should be the
same basic process that an economist would use in many torts valuation decisions.
The economist talks of three basic methods that can be used to value a business. 2'6
The economist uses either an actual market approach, a discounted cash flow approach,
or a "net asset" approach, If the business is in a widely traded group of like businesses,
then the value is determined with reference to the "actual market" for the business. The
actual market gives the best price received in a recent exchange of a very similar business.
At first appearance this process of determining value has intuitive appeal. This process,
however, has inherent circularity to it. Valuation by reference to actual market transac-
tions is a method that relies on the intuition that similar assets have similar value without
making plain how an asset's value is determined in the first place. This method depends
on the basic economic tenet that the value of any item is a function of the amount and
character of the returns that one can expect to derive from the item. The volatility of
those returns also conditions value since the economist tells us that two assets with like
estimated expected returns will not be equal unless the risk associated with each return
is roughly equal.237 Even after the economist's underlying tenets are disclosed, however,
the problem of circularity remains. Volitility or risk of return is only discovered with
reference to comparable investments and these comparables are, once again, market
determined. 238
The subjective nature of the determinants of market interest rates which allegedly
drive market values is also readily apparent. The determinants include the inclination
of some people to borrow in order to be able to buy now rather than later; the inclination
of others to save now in order to be able to buy what they need later in life; and the
inclination of others to borrow in order to finance a machine or some other productive
255 See Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973);
Swanton v. State Guaranty Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477,215 A.2d 242 (1965); Application of Delaware
Racing Association, 42 Del. Ch. 406,213 A.2d 203 (1965).
236 W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 129-30 (1980) there-
inafter cited as W. CARYI.
237 W. KI.EIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 202
(1980).
258 1d. at 202-03.
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process, which depends, of course, on the availability of money. The ability of economists
to predict interest rates with any certainty is highly problematic and the literature on
the determinants of the interest rates is at best difficult. 232
To trust the actual market's ability to come up with a true value one must believe
the market has perfect information and is an absolutely efficient and effective processor
of society wants and needs. Because the market is governed by many unpredictable,
perhaps nonrational forces, much of the value given to a business is dependent upon
the collective fleeting preferences of the market's various individual participants. Ac-
cordingly, the value of a business is affected by the Federal Reserve Board's policy
concerning the money supply, by market psychology, and by general business optimism
or pessimism. Perhaps Posner would argue that these "hypothetical market" variables
are supplied by references to or borrowings from the actual market's experience with
valuation. If Posner, however, makes this allowance, the decisionmaker's freedom to
second guess the actual market would reduce the certainty and consistency of the system.
Granting that such a method might be useful in some situations, valuation by
reference to market prices is often impossible where there are not comparable businesses
that are widely traded. In these situations the economist would use either the method
of discounting cash flows from the business to determine its present worth or would
value according to the net asset value approach. Taking the discounted cash flow ap-
proach first, this method is described as follows:
The appraiser generally starts by computing the average earning for the
corporation in the past number of years .... Extraordinary gains and losses
are excluded from the average earnings - calculation ... The appraiser then
selects a multiplier [to be applied to average earnings] which reflects the
prospective financial condition of the corporation and the risk factor inherent
in the corporation and the industry .... In selecting the multiplier, the
appraiser generally looks to other comparable corporations. [Then the value
obtained by multiplying the average earnings times the multiplier is dis-
counted to its present value]. 240
The consequentialist nature of this process is readily apparent. The process involves
predicting the life of average earnings, it involves a guess about the length of time such
business will be carried on into the future, and it involves a guess as to a discount rate
that will adequately take into account the real return rates of future investments. The
process of valuation, therefore, involves the setting of probabilities on many different
and interrelated occurrences. As such it is a very difficult and inexact process that
presumes the existence of perfect information and the ability to determine exact prob-
abilities. For instance, a slight variance in the discount rate over a number of years would
greatly change the value given the business.
Finally, the economist may use the net asset valuation method. This is the method
most often used when there is little actual trading and few comparable businesses, that
is, when there is little or no experience with the activity.24 ' The process simply tries to
value the parts of the activity at a given time, according to certain accounting principles,
and weigh these assets against the company's liabilities which are also determined by
439 W. GARY, supra note 236, at 129-30.
"E' W. KLEIN, supra note 237, at 202.
741 W. CARY, supra note 236, at 129.
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accounting principles. Accounting principles direct an accountant to value certain items
by their actual cost less depreciation or by their liquidation value. The accountant's
computations are reported on the company's business balance sheet from which one can
determine the company's "book value." Professor Cary presents a very short critique of
the process of looking at the valuation of book values, which demonstrates that it is
subjective and very consequentiaiist:
In general, there is nearly complete agreement that book value does not
accurately represent the fair valuation of corporate assets. It is essentially a
historical figure. Balance sheets usually list assets at original cost, less depre-
ciation, which may differ greatly from present usable value or the present
cost of equivalent assets. In most cases liquidation value of the assets is not
an appropriate consideration, since "liquidation" comprehends the termi-
nation of the business and disposal of the assets [this liquidation method or
salvage value is inappropriate since the business is continuing and the asset
has more value as it continues to produce and be used]. Reproduction cost
less depreciation (and obsolescence) may be used, although it is an uncertain
measure of value because of the implicit assumption that the plant or other
tangible assets would be reproduced in substantially their present form. [The
process also involves predicting the life expectancy of an asset to determine
a depreciation figure. If an incorrect useful life expectancy is used in the
calculation the true value is thrown off]. 242
Cary's comment points out that "cost" of an item depends on the scarcity of the
item and demand for it at any given time. The determination of value, however, seems
to involve an analysis of an item's past, present, and future supply and demand. Once
again, if the decisionmaker recognizes that these are future looking features he will and
perhaps should exercise his discretion to value the item's "true" cost. If the decisionmaker
is free to do this, whatever is gained in "accuracy" is set off by a loss in consistency.
If we take these three alternative decisionmaking systems of analysis and apply them
to Posner's hypothetical problem of valuing walking very fast we are faced with a process
that is no better in producing a consistent definite decision than the duty/breach analysis.
After first taking stock of Posner's reminder to view the value of walking very fast not
as the defendant actually viewed it but instead as the hypothetical market would value
it, we are faced with applying either actual market, discounted cash flow, or net asset
value analysis or some combination. If I place myself for a moment into the economist's
shoes, since I have no information on a recent exchange of dollar value for the activity
of walking very fast, and I presume none can be presented, I must rule out the use of
the market value method. I am left with a method choice between discounted cash flow
or a net benefit over costs. 243 Under a discounted cash flow analysis I would look at the
past value or "cash flow" produced to society of walking very fast over a period of years
and try to average it and project its continued value to society. 244 From whose perspective
do I value it? From society's, from the defendant's, from mine? Oh, yes, I remember I
use a hypothetical market. Is this to ask what society would pay the defendant in his
situation to keep him from walking very fast? Perhaps I should find relevant to my
consideration alternative modes of transportation available to the defendant and the
242 Id.
24 ' Set, W. KLEIN, supra note 237, at 214.
244 Id.
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value to society over time of the defendant's and other person's use of these. Perhaps
the economist would consider these alternatives as the opportunity cost to the defendant.
The economist might suggest that I extrapolate from the defendant's expected rate of
return of walking very fast versus other alternatives. This should then turn my thinking
to the assignment of a discount rate which would, voila, determine from the value of the
activity to the defendant over time, the present value of the activity — but I am at a loss
and my head is spinning.
Instead, I might jump at a simpler process, and try using the net asset analysis. I
might simply try to determine, at the time of defendant's decision, the net cost to society
of walking very fast when compared to its benefits. Again, at what point do I value the
activity and how do I accurately take into account its past value and future value? I
would be sorely tempted to value walking very fast on my personal belief of what ought
to be its value instead of how society might actually value it.
Note the similarities of any of the three valuation techniques — market approach,
net asset approach, and discounted cash flow approach — to the duty/breach process.
The decisionmaker must struggle with the problem of determining whether his expe-
rience gives him enough information about the hypothetical market to be able to value
the item properly. He must trust his intuitions that his experience is society's experience
with the item. He must struggle with knowing when to stop considering the ripple effects
of his decision concerning value of the item. In this way he is struggling with the same
evidentiary limitations and definitions of relevance that the jury struggles with in "neg-
ligence." He must also struggle with the dilemma of when to value an activity by what
he feels "ought" to be the value instead of what "is" the value. In this instance he is
struggling with the same issue the jury faces when deciding whether to hold a defendant
to a higher standard than that set by the existing custom regarding defendant's behavior.
Use of the hypothetical market does not deal with the ethical inconsistency or indefi-
niteness of consequentialist theories any better than does the appeal to a reasonable
person standard. Economics tell the decisionmaker to "find" what he cannot with cer-
tainty find and predict what he cannot definitely predict. Such a system is most incon-
sistent and indefinite where it requires a prediction of future consequences.by referring
one to a highly structured dogmatic system of rules which provide the decisionmaker
little information about the decision.
As has been noted, the problem of valuation is filled with uncertainties. Each
valuation method is filled with circularities and fails to guard against the problems of
imperfect information. In addition, each method lacks specific guidelines for making
future predictions about value and buries the subjectivity of the process in economic
jargon. Even if, however, the economist could provide a dollar value for the cost to the
defendant to protect against harm, and a dollar value for the damages that the defen-
dant's activity may cause, so that under the Hand formula both the "B" (for burden)
and the "L" (for extent of the liability) could be filled in, the variable "P" (for probability)
is still undetermined. 245
The assignment of a probability also has both consequentialist and nonconsequen-
tialist features. Though assigning probabilities seems to only involve a determination
from evidence of the past events the likelihood of some future event," whether in fact
2" See R. POSNER, ECONOMICS, supra note I. at 122-23.
248 W. SALMON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE 68 (1967). Salmon refers to this
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this process can ever be done without skewing the probabilities in favor of a preferred
outcome is highly questionable. 247 In fact, some argue that decisionmakers will inevitably
assign the probability with reference to their own beliefs about the best outcomes for
description of probability as the "Logical Interpretation" of probability. He writes that such a
description involves inductive reasoning. Id. at 68-69.
2" Salmon calls this description of probability the subjective theory. Salmon writes of Rudolf
Carnap's theory of inductive logic which relates to Posner's attempts at defining an economic ethic:
Carnap's earlier systems of inductive logic have been criticized — especially by those
who are more interested in questions of practical statistical inference than in foun-
dational questions — on the ground that the [Carnap's] confirmation functions were
defined for extremely simple languages. The' languages embody only qualitative con-
cepts, that are patently inadequate as languages for science. In his more recent work,
Carnap has been developing systems that are able to treat physical magnitudes quan-
titatively.
Id. at 74.
Posner's ethical analysis parallels Carnap's analysis in that he suggests that tort should as nearly
as possible make value judgments in quantitative terms. Salmon, however, in criticizing Carnap,
provides the foundational criticism of Carnap's theory which likewise applies to Posner's efforts:
As the preceding remarks should indicate, Carnap has been acutely aware of various
technical difficulties in his earlier treatments of the logical interpretation of probability,
and he has made enormous strides in overcoming them. There is, however, in my
opinion, a fundamental problem at the heart of the logical interpretation. It is, I think,
a difficulty of principle which cannot be avoided by technical developments. It seems
to be intrinsic to the entire conception of probability as a logical relation between
evidence and,hypothesis.
The logical interpretation involves, in an essential way, the conception of proba-
bility as a measure of possible states of affairs. Whether the measure is attached to
statements describing these possibilities (i.e., state descriptions or.structure descrip-
tions) or to the possibilities themselves (i.e., facts, propositions, models), the measure
is indispensible. There are many alternative ways of assigning such a measure; for
instance, there are infinitely many different ways of assigning nonnegative weights to
the state descriptions of our simple illustrative language in such a way that together
they total one. As a matter of fact, Carnap has described a continuum of weightings,
and there are others beyond the scope of that collection. Alternative methods of
weighting have, of course, differing degrees of intuitive plausibility. The inescapable
questions is: How are we to select the appropriate weighting or measure from the
superdenumerable infinity of candidates?
One feature of the choice has single importance: The choice must be a priori. We
may not wait to see how frequently a property occurs in order to assign it a weight;
an a posteriori method of this sort would have to find its place within one of the
interpretations still to be discussed. The problem is to show how we can make a choice
that is not completely arbitrary. Assuming we have made a definite choice, this choice
defines the notions of degree of confirmation and logical probability. It determines our
inductive logic. As a consequence, degree of confirmation statements, or statements
of logical probability, are analytic if they are true (self-contradictory if they are false).
They are statements whose truth or falsity are results of definitions and pure logic
alone; they have no synthetic or factual content. Given any hypothesis "h" and any
consistent evidence statement "e," the degree of confirmation "c(h,e)" can be estab-
lished by computation alone, as we saw in dealing with our examples above. The
question is: How can statements that say nothing about any matters of fact serve as "a guide
of life?"
Id, at 75-76 (emphasis added).
Salmon argues that Carnap ultimately answers this above question from the position of an
inductive intuitionist. Id. at 78. Posner, like Carnap, has the inductive intuitionist basis for his ethical
system.
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the analysis.24° In this way the process of assigning probabilities is very much like
argument by analogy. As with argument by analogy, the assigning of a probability has a
mixed consequentialist/nonconsequentialist ethic to it. It is arguably tied to past events
but also faced with predicting the future in the light of new, changing circumstances.
Even l if the psychology of the process would allow for an assignment of an objective
probability figure, such a process is very uncertain where there is little or no experience
with 9r empirical data for assigning the probability. As such it is primarily a consequen-
tialist'process, very much like the "custom" arguments in the analysis of breach. Where
society changes so rapidly that the decisionmaker has little or no experience with the
injury-producing situation, the decisionmaker would be faced with trusting only his
intuition. He would most likely then assign a high probability if his intuition tells him
that it is likely to affect society badly or a low probability if his intuition tells him its
effect would not have a meaningful impact. This analysis suggests that assignment of
probabilities is very consequentialist and becomes more nonconsequentialist only where
society has had experience with the accident. 249 It is incorrect that the process of assigning
probabilities is necessarily a nonconsequentialist process or that it provides the same
degree of ethical certainty in all situations. 250 Assuming that the economist could over-
come these problems, the economists ethical system would have one remaining obstacle
to overcome, and that obstacle is a processing problem. As to "who" is to make the
decision about wealth maximization, Posner discloses little, only asserting that this val-
uation process and application of the Hand formula will be and can be done by a court.
Posner simply states that "a court can make a reasonably accurate guess as to the
allocation of resources that would maximize wealth." 25 ' It is interesting to speculate as
to "who" Posner is referring to when he says that the decision will be made by "the
court." Since he does not specify whether judge, jury, a combination of judge and jury,
or an economic expert under cover of the court, 252 will make the decision, it is unclear
whether the decision will be made by a "fact finding" or by a "law making" person. 253
Since we are not told the nature of the decisionmaker, the usual ethical indications given
by this information are lacking.
It is important to speculate concerning the varying alternatives available to Posner's
economic model under existing adjudicative constraints and what each means for the
ethics of economics. The decision process could be controlled by economic experts who
could give opinions as to the "value" of certain activities with reference only to the
hypothetical market. These opinions could be given and justified by reference to what
experts "usually" rely on in giving these expert opinions. 254 The "fact finding process"
would be done "under cover" if the courts use this economic decisionmaking process.
2'8 Id. at 79. This view Salmon calls the Personalists view. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note
22.
"" W. SALMON, SUpra. note 246, at 76.
25° Id. Salmon notes that determining probabilities with any certainty depends on the require-
ment of total evidence. Id. Note that in this way economic analysis parallels negligence analysis; that
where society has had wide experience with a certain type of accident, that the "rules" are more
easily and consistently applied.
251 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note I, at 120.
Id.
259
	 Posner implies that the economic analysis is to be done by the judge. R. POSNER,
ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 18.
2" See FED. R. Evil). 703.
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The economic expert would provide his opinion as to "value," and the court would end
up deciding little more than if the economic expert is credible, or, if there is more than
one expert, which one is more credible. Thus, under this alternative, the court would
be left with plugging the value and probability given by the expert into the Hand formula
and waiting for the answer to come out. One wonders how it is that the economic expert
is any better than a jury at assigning probabilities. Perhaps the jury could be given the
task of assigning a probability. It is easy to see, however, that even with the jury included,
such a decisionmaking process gives major decisionmaking responsibilities to the eco-
nomic expert that were previously given to the jury and/or judge. Hence, the overall
process appears to be nonconsequentialist because the expert's "findings" would be
inserted into a formula which Posner believes will guarantee wealth maximization. Under
this alternative the process would be very rule oriented and absolutist and, therefore,
very nonconsequentialist in appearance. The consequentialist nature of the process
would be carried on by the economist.
If the decision is to be more than a credibility vote, the information — the "stuff"
of the judge's or jury's decision — will necessarily have to be expanded to take into
account a much broader statement of relevance. 25' Under this alternative the court,
either judge or jury, would therefore be required to "do" the economic analysis by
looking to the hypothetical market. Under the jury alternative, juries would most likely
assign various values and probabilities to situations depending on their experience with
the various activities. The various consequentialist features of the process would then be
the subject of the jury's deliberations. Faith in the ability of the jury to deliberate under
these instructions would be, as it is with the reasonably prudent person instruction, the
key to one's acceptance of this alternative. 25"
The third alternative decisionmaker is the judge. Under this alternative the judge
would necessarily be made the economic expert. Making the judge the decisionmaker
would allow for a mixed consequentialistinonconsequentialist system like that evaluation
in the duty analysis. This alternative would force the judge into the same dilemma he
has when determining duty by analogy. He would have to deal with the consequentialist
aspects of the decision directives in one of two ways: either subvert the policy rationale
by an obscured conclusion regarding the hypothetical market valuation of an activity, or
try to justify systematically, based on a hypothetical market analysis of values, the true
soothsaying basis of his decision. If the latter is the economist's choice then there are yet
unanswered questions as to what information the court will consider in making the
determination and who will present it. The result of the economic system's choice as to
who should make these decisions will either make the system more openly consequen-
tialist or subvert and disguise the consequentialist aspects in the opinion and jargon of
the economist.
With this description of Posner's system before us it is easy to see that from the
philosophical ethicist's perspective, there are predictable criticisms of the different as-
pects of economic analysis. 257 These criticisms should remind us of the criticism of duty
and breach. This system is subject to attack for uncertainty and lack of definiteness. For
instance, it is subject to much debate why anyone would assume that a wealth maximi-
255 W. SALMON, supra note 246, at 76.
"6 Id.
257
	
criticisms ring consistent with those criticisms Thiroux predicted he would have.
Englard, supra note 2, at 51-56.1 THIROUX, supra note 16, at 34-38,50-51.
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zation principle will produce good. 258
 If the principle of wealth maximization means
nothing more than a process by which good is maximized then the statement is no
improvement over the existing utilitarian formulation. 252
 This seems to be part of what
Posner attempts when he defines wealth as the value in dollars - or dollar equivalents of
everything in society. 26° Second, the consequentialist would ask how it is that the Hand
formula really serves society by producing wealth maximization. Why, for instance, is
the Hand test used rather than a reverse Learned Hand test, where the mathematical
formula is also B < P x L, but burden is instead associated with the plaintiff's cost or
burden of preventing the accident? 21
 At this point, the Holmes rationale of "little
government interference," his definition of act, and his "sense of justice" certainly seem
applicable as arguments for Hand's formula. As such, economics is ultimately supported
by a part of the same belief system as is negligence. In addition, where Posner is overly
consequentialist in his directives concerning the ability of the market to project future
values, one must question the capability of ever having adequate information about the
consequences of certain decisions or the future values of certain commodities. 262 Without
such information predicting the consequences or values is a very uncertain process. The
economist can guarantee no more certainty about the consequences he projects than can
the judge in the proximate cause analysis in the fault based system. 26'
Posner's system also has the same inconsistencies as negligence where it tries to be
most nonconsequentialist. How is it that the use of hypothetical markets and the Hand
formula magically produce accurate evaluations? Is this not a leap of faith akin to the
leap of faith which the negligence system makes when it appeals to the reasonably
prudent person? 264
 The acceptance of the nonconsequentialist aspects of the market
theory depends upon one's acceptance of the assumptions that the economist makes. 2"5
These assumptions are the economist's articles of faith. 266
 Moreover, these assumptions
are certainly not without criticism. 267
 For instance, one may question why it is that a
hypothetical market is useful, reliable, or even useable. 268
 Use of hypothetical markets
has proved, in certain cases, to be a very subjective and arbitrary system of decision-
making. 262
 Additionally, one might criticize the lack of empirical verification for the
validity of the decisions produced by the use of hypothetical markets. 2" Such subjectivity
at such a crucial level produces many of the inconsistencies of which Posner claims his
2"1 THIROUX, supra note 16, at 34-38.
259 Id.
262 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 1, at 119.
261 Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 1059.
282 1 THIROUX, supra note 16, at 34-38; W. SALMON, supra note 246, at 76.
2" W. SALMON, supra note 246, at 76.
264
 Posner is not blind to these criticisms. See R. POSNER, ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 19-23. It
seems he has forgotten the limitations of his own theorizing in making the ethical claims.
262 Id.
266 Id.
262 Englard, supra note 2, at 51-56.
268
 Id. at 39.
262 W. KLEIN, supra note 237, at 202. Klein writes: "Moreover, valuation by reference to market
prices of comparable assets involves an obvious problem of circularity; it is a method that tells us
that similar assets have similar values without telling us anything about how that value is deter-
mined." Id.
270 W. SALMON, supra note 246, at 75.
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system is free. 271 In this way his system is subject to the same "leap of faith," subjectivity,
and latk of empirical verification criticisms to which all nonconsequentialist systems are
subject.272
Both systems provide consequentialist directives to be processed by nonconsequen-
tialist decisionmaking constraints. As such, both systems are subject to inconsistent meth-
ods and uses of justification. Where they are consequentialist in their directives they are
open to criticisms for lack of definiteness as each system tries to define the "good" that
their principles will produce. They are also burdened with an inability to prove or
guarantee the future "good" from the use of their principles. Where each has processing
constraints which are very dogmatic and nonconsequentialist the systems are open to
criticisms for producing inconsistent and unpredictable results that do not serve society's
widely held beliefs concerning what is in its best interest. The criticisms point out the
lack of rational justifications for the assumptions that undergird their processing direc-
tives.
As the philosophers have long pointed out, these criticisms are not unique to the
systems of tort law, but exist in any normative ethical decisionmaking system. Perhaps,
however, the tort system, which must try to operate in the adjudicatory constraints
imposed by the "real world," is driven, for the sake of appearances, to pretend the
criticisms are not valid. 273 It is interesting to note that what the economic system tries to
do is what current philosophers argue is the best bet at bridging the inconsistencies of
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist systems. 274 These philosophers argue that the
key to a unified and consistent system is a wide acceptance of the underlying faith in
the tenets and assumptions of an ethical system. 276 Once agreement is reached among
all the participants in such systems, and a process for consistent decisionmaking is found,
then those who agree both with the principles of the system and with its process will be
satisfied with the consistency, definiteness and completeness of their system. 276
One of the major critiques, however, of such a system is the cost to society of getting
the members to agree to the underlying tenets of the proposed system and also the cost
to society of the extensive processes necessary in order to provide all the information
necessary to insure the results of the system.277 This cost crititque of the "collectivized
utilitarian" model, of insuring the absolute certainty and completeness of the system's
decisionmaking process, 276 has been fully discussed elsewhere.276
Despite the problems with the cost of collective utilitarianism, a greater problem
would result even if agreement could be reached that economic analysis should be
adopted wholesale. The problem that remains is the exclusivity in the economist's un-
derlying assumption concerning the rationality of man. This underlying faith in the
"rationality" of man may tend to create a monopoly in the way in which the future is
predicted. The language of economics is the language of materialism. I t seeks to quantify
everything in terms of dollars and cents and is preoccupied with probabilities. It thereby
271 Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note I, at III.
272 1 TIIIROUX, supra note 16, at 50.
275 Id.
271 D. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERATION (1980).
271 Id. at chapter 8.
276 Id.
277
	
Book Review, 80 MICE'. L. REV. 701 (1982).
278 Id.
279 Id.
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puts a premium on the empirical, the measurable and the scientific, at the exclusion of
the ideal, the emotional, and the religious.
As has been noted, the traditional negligence language, on the other hand, has left
undisclosed the underlying assumptions of its utilitarianism. 2" This allows more toler-
ance of the ideal, the intuitive, and the religious methodologies of making future pre-
dictions. It also allows for more competition in methods of predicting the future. Pref-
erence for the traditional negligence formulations is ironically somewhat "market"
driven. The beauty of traditional negligence language is that it allows judges' and jurors'
different belief systems the room to compete under the guise of duty, reasonableness,
and causation. As has been seen in the earlier discussions of negligence, reasonableness
leaves room for both the rational and the "religious," the material and the ideal. For
very good reasons, individual decisionmakers may disagree with the underlying faith in
the "rationality" of a process that tries to scientifically measure something without ade-
quate definitions or measuring devices.
In any event, once the common consequentialist/nonconsequentialist characteristics
of ethical systems that compete in the area of tort law have been revealed, the true
nature of the systems are also revealed: that they are fundamentally based on beliefs
and assumptions. This changes the nature of the competition. The debate must now be
concerned with freedom of thought issues instead of being concerned solely with logical
definiteness, completeness, and consistency since there can be no winner under this
criteria.
CONCLUSION
The language of traditional negligence law, which refers courts to questions of duty,
breach, and proximate cause, is a confused and frustrating mix of consequentialist and
nonconsequentialist ethics. Its processing techniques so structure the tort decision as to
bury its consequentialist features in the nonconsequentialist language of making "find-
ings" and applying "objective" criteria. It also leaves unstated the consequentialist nature
of its processing elements. Economic analysis does not improve the traditional analysis.
While economic analysis makes more explicit the consequentialist nature of its principles
it does no better a job of demonstrating predictability or certainty in the use of its
principles. The nonconsequential mathematical nature of its processing devices are no
better at disguising the consequentialist features of its system than is the prima facie case
in hiding the inherent consequentialism of traditional negligence law.
Economics should not, therefore, claim ethical superiority for its system. Economic
analysis should recognize that its "structured consequentialism" is none the less conse-
quentialist. It should be more frank about the subjectivity inherent in any ethical system
that is involved in predicting what will be the future value to society of present decisions
and activities.
"(3 See, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Normalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451,
453-59 (1974) (discussion of related criticism of economic analysis). See also Englard, supra note 2,
for his critique of Calabresi's economics.
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